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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES L. BENNETT, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellarvt·, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Case No. 
7287 
The parties will be referred to as in the Court below. 
All italics are ours. 
Plaintiff deems it proper, helpful and necessary to 
make a rather full, complete and exhaustive statement 
of facts in order that the Court may be fully advised 
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2 
with respect to the evidence concerning all material 
issues. 
The event resulting in the injuries to plaintiff oc-
curred while he was engaged in the performance of his 
duties as brakeman in defendant's employ at Buena 
Vista, Colorado at about the hour of 8 :35 o'clock p.m. 
on the 7th day of January, 1948. 
His action was filed in the Third Judicial District. 
Court in and for :Salt Lake County, Utah, where the mat-
ter was tried before a jury, The jury's verdict, dated 
l\1arch 24, 1948, is as follows (R. 72) : 
''We, the Jurors impaneled in the above case, 
find the issues in favor of the Plaintiff and against 
the Defendant and assess damages as follows: 
Total Damage ------------------------------$70,000.00 
Diminution, by reason of con-
tributory negligence, if any __ $20,000.00 
Net amount of verdict ----------------$50,000.00'' 
The defendant's Motion for New Trial was denied 
on the 27th day of September, 1948, some six months 
following the conclusion of the trial. 
In his complaint, the plaintiff charged defendant 
with suddenly, unexpectedly and without warning caus-
ing the speed of the locomotive handling the cut of cars· 
upon which plaintiff was stationed to be sharply reduced, 
thereby causing the slack to run in, producing a severe 
and unexpected jar, jolt and jerk of the cars, which 
threw plaintiff off the car onto the rails where his right 
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arm was crushed and mangled, necessitating amputation 
at the shoulder. 
Plaintiff also invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur, alleging that at all times prior to the occurrence 
of the event complained of defendant had exclusive con-
trol of the locomotive and each and all of the cars com-
prising the cut upon which plaintiff was stationed and 
working, and that the violent and extraordinary slack 
action which caused plaintiff to' be thrown from the top 
of the car was an. event of such nature and character 
that in the ordinary course of' things would not have 
occurred had defendant exercis~d due and proper care 
in the operation of its locomotiye (R. 5, 6). 
The trial court did not submit the matter of res ipsa 
loquitur to the jury but did submit the issue of the sud-
den jerk. Instruction No. 7 (R. 59) was as follows: 
"It was the duty of the defendant company, 
acting through its employees, to use ordinary and 
reasonable care in its railroad operations to 
avoid injury to its employees, and to operate its 
train in such a manner as to avoid any unusual, 
excessive, and unexpected amount of slack action 
or jerking upon said cars. 
''If you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that in the course of his duty, the plain-
tiff was on top of said car, and that there was 
unusual, excessive, and unexpected jerking there-
of, which proximately caused him to fall there-
from, that would indicate negligence on the part 
of the defendant, for which the plaintiff would 
have a right to recover damages." 
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Defendant admitted that it was engaged as a com-
mon carrier by rail in interstate commerce at the time 
of plaintiff's injury and likewise admitted that plaintiff 
was engaged in the performance of his duties at said 
time and place and that he suffered the injuries com-
plained of. Defendant denied the other allegations of 
tJlaintiff's complaint. 
Upon the admitted facts the remedy afforded plain-
tiff is controlled by the provisions of the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 51, provid-
ing, in so far as material here, as follows: 
''Every common carrier by railroad while 
engaging in commerce between any of the several 
states or territories, * * * shall be liable in dam-
ages to any person suffering injury while he is 
employed by such carrier in such commerce * * * 
for such injury or death resulting in whole or 
in part from the negligence of any of the officers, 
agents, or employees of such carrier * * * ; '' 
and 'Section 53, reading as follows : 
''In all actions hereafter brought against any 
common carrier by railroad under or by virtue 
of any of the provisions of this chapter to re-
cover damages for personal injuries to an em-
ployee, or where such injuries have resulted in his 
death, the fact that the employee may have been 
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a 
recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by 
the jury in proportion to the amount of negli-
gence attributable to such employee: Provided, 
that no such employee who may be injured or 
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killed shall be held to haYe been guilty of con-
tributory negligence in any case where the viola-
tion by such comn1on rarrier of any statute 
enarted for the safety of en1plo)·ees contributed 
to the injury or death of such employee." 
There was no material conflict in the testimony. 
The endence con.clusively demonstrated that plaintiff 
was injured in the course of his employment, conclusively 
demonstrated that defendant, acting through its ser-
vants, agents and employees other than plaintiff, so 
negligently and carelessly controlled its train as to cause 
a sudden, unexpected and extraordinarily severe jerk 
of the car upon which plaintiff was stationed and that 
due to said jerk plaintiff was dislodged and thrown from 
the car onto the tracks, where his right arm was mangled 
and mutilated by rolling car wheels, necessitating am-
putation at the shoulder. 
Under the evidence the negligence of defendant be-
came a question for the jury and the jury upon proper 
instructions found defendant negligent as charged. The 
jury, however, erroneously diminished the verdict on 
account of contributory negligence and this error Is 
brought before this Court by plaintiff's cross-appeal. 
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the court 
to grant its motion for a new trial, contending that the 
verdict was excessive and returned under the influence 
of passion and prejudice engendered by the admission 
of improper testimony and by a series of prejudicial inci-
dents occurring at the trial. It also assigns as error the 
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admission in evidence of plaintiff's exhibits "G" and 
"H". 
B. THE FACTS 
We shall present the facts of this case under the fol-
lowing headings : 
(a) LIABILITY. 
(b) DAMAGES. 
(c) THE TABLES. 
(a) LIABILITY 
In this section we shall endeavor to cover in detail 
all of the evidence pertaining to the event causing in-
juries, for the purpose of revealing the abundance of 
proof to sustain the verdict, and likewise to demonstrate 
the absolute absence of any evidence whatsoever to sup-
port the finding of contributory negligence submitted to 
the jury over plaintiff's objection as a result of which 
plaintiff's verdict was reduced and diminished as here-
inabove set forth. 
Beginning at Record, on page 126, plaintiff's testi-
mony reveals the following: He was twenty-six years of 
age when injured. He first entered the employ of the 
defendant at Salida, Colorado, and his seniority date was 
established as of February 18, 1942. When injured he 
was working as head brakeman on a regular job. He 
had been able to hold a regular job most of the time 
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since his return from Navy Service, in November of 
19-15. He was injured while working on a regularly 
scheduled east bound freight train. He was called at 
:Jiinturn at about 1 :-!5 o'clock p.m., the crew consisting 
of engineer, George B. Cooley; fireman, Robert J. 
Intchauspe; conductor, A. R. Williams; hind brakeman, 
Drexel ~Ioore; and plaintiff, head brakeman. 
It is the duty of the head brakeman to let off brakes, 
open couplers, connect and disconnect air hose. He more 
or less follows the engine around, makes joints, couples 
and uncouples cars, passes signals and throws switches. 
Before the train reached Buena Vista plaintiff re-
ceived instructions from the conductor as to the switch-
ing movements to be made there. When the train reached 
Buena Vista it consisted of sixty cars powered by four-
unit Diesel Engine No. 546. It was dark. 
The orders were to divide the train after it stopped 
on the main line between the tenth and eleventh cars. 
Plaintiff dropped off near the main line switch as the 
engine went by preparatory to making the cut at the de-
sired point and lining the switch. He was equipped with 
a brake club made of hardwood, approximately three to 
three and a half feet in length and about three inches 
in circumference, and a lighted lantern. After the train 
stopped plaintiff turned the angle cocks at the joining 
ends of the tenth and eleventh cars, broke the air hose 
and pulled the pin. He then gave a proceed signal and 
the locomotive, with the ten cars coupled, moved on 
down the main line until the rear car of the cut cleared 
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the switch points. Plaintiff dismounted from the tenth 
car, gave the engineer a stop sign and lined the switch 
so that the cut could be backed off the main line onto 
the passing track. After all the required switching oper-
ations were carried out on the tracks adjacent to and 
connecting with the main line track, the locomotive with 
fourteen cars coupled proceeded out along the Ice House 
Track toward the main line track, where the outbound 
train was to be made up. During this movement plain-
tiff sustained his injuries. His testimony concerning the 
event is as follows, commencing at Record 144: 
'' Q. All right, now, after you had accomplished 
that movement that I have now recited to you, 
just what did you do¥ 
A. I was on top of the rear car, which is the 
14th car, and I gave a proceed signal to the 
engineer that-to proceed down the ice house 
track. 
Q. You had a hold of fourteen cars¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. That is, after you had made these spots at 
the ice house, did you uncouple the cut at 
the point between the fourteenth and fifteenth 
car¥ 
A. No, sir ; I was on top passing signals ; the 
conductor made the cut. In order to make 
this cut, the slack was bunched in, and, in 
order to make the cut, why we had to back 
the fourteen cars back enough so that theY 
could pull the pin, and, on the ground, yo~ 
can't give a signal to the engineer, so there 
has to be somebody on top in order to gi\·c 
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the signal, and somebody else had to pull the 
pin. 
Q. Did anybody tell you to go high, go on top~ 
~\. \Yell, not that I remember; I mean, that was 
just in course of my work 
Q. Did you regard that as being your duty to 
go high on the fourteenth car~ 
A. Yes, sir, that was my duty. 
* * * * 
Q. What was the nature of the signal you passed 
to the engine~ 
A. It was a proceed signal. 
Q. Where with respect to the stock loading 
chutes was the fourteenth car at the time you 
went high~ 
A. It was quite a ways forward of stock chutes. 
Q. East or west~ 
A. West. 
Q. Do you know whether or not there was any 
signs, warning signs, placed there in con-
nection with these stock loading chutes~ 
A. Yes, sir, there is a sign there that warns you 
of the stock chute; it says, 'This sign will 
not clear a man on the side or on top of 
car.' 
Q. Now, I want to know about where the loco-
motive was when you passed this sign from 
the top of the fourteenth car~ 
A. I imagine it was east, somewhere east of the 
sign, or west, I mean. 
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Q. Somewhat west of the sign~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was it with reference-having in mind 
the crossover from the passing track, stock 
ice house, about .where was the locomotive? 
A. I imagine two car-lengths west of the cross-
over. 
* * * * 
Q. Now, did the engineer respond to the pro-
ceed signal~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And, at the time that the train was placed 
in motion, where were you~ 
A. On top of the rear car, in the middle of the 
car. 
• ,. * * 
Q. * * All right, now, just using your own 
words, you tell us now what happened as the 
cut of cars that you were on was moving 
toward the east pursuant to the proceed sig-
nal you passed to the engineer 1 
A. Well, as I stated before, I gave a 'proceed' 
signal, and he accepted proceed signal and 
started westward down the ice house track. 
Q. Is that westward or eastward~ 
• • • * 
A. Excuse me, It was going eastward down the 
ice house track, and he was going, I 
thought, at a pretty good rate of speed, and 
we got-I made, we got down there close to 
the derail, and I made preparations to get 
off to line the mainline switch from the 
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passing track, and, as I was in a crouched 
position, why the slack ran in and gave me 
a violent jerk, and that dislodged me, and 
the slack run back out and threw me in he-
tween the thirteenth' and fourteenth car, and 
I hit my head on something, I don't know 
whether it was on the thirteenth or four-
teenth car; it all happened so fast, and, then, 
the next thing I knew I was on the ground, 
and seemed like I was drugged for a minute. 
Then my-I don't recall whether my arm 
was run over before I was drug·ged or after; 
in other words, it was just a mere second 
that I was drugged for a while, and then I 
remember the cars just running on down the 
track, and I made a pretense of getting up, 
of standing up, and I got in about a half 
crouch and fell back down, and then I tried 
to crawl for a ways-I thought. it was a ways 
-and I seen I couldn't do that, so I just 
started hollering for help, and, after a few 
seconds, why there was two or three people 
around me at that time, * * * 
'* • * * 
A. Well, and they could see that I was hurt, 
and, naturally, they wanted to do everything 
that they could for me, and - -
Q. What was the condition of your right arm 
at that time 1 
A. Well, I don't really know the condition of it. 
It was run over, but it still was in contact-
I mean, I still will say I still had my arm. 
Q. Where did the train that you were on stop 
there, near where you were hurt 1 
A. I don't know exactly where the train stopped. 
I didn't pay any at!ention after-all that I 
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remember was that the cars were just-kept 
on rolling by, and I didn't pay any attention 
to where cars stopped or anything. 
Q. Where did you fall with reference to the de-
rail you pointed out to the jury~ 
A. I believe it was about eight feet west of the 
derail. 
Q. Which switch was it you were going to line¥ 
A. The main line switch from the passing track. 
Q. Charles, you stated that the train, the cut, 
was moving 'down along the stock ice house 
track, you had some idea of the speed; will 
you tell the jury, if you have any opinion, as 
to how fast the train was moving at the time 
that this slack action took place¥ 
A. I'd say twelve to fifteen miles an hour. 
Q. Can you describe the slack action or the 
jerk, whatever it was, that dislodged you¥ 
* * * * 
A. Well, it was an action of running in, this 
fourteenth car ran into the rest of the train 
with a hard motion that came at, at a violent 
rate, and then it backed out. 
* * * * 
A. Came in a backward position, and this ac-
tion was enough that it dislodged me from 
the grab iron, and the action, the movement 
backward, was enough to throw me in be-
tween the thirteenth and fourteenth car. 
Q. Now, just before this slack action occurred, 
just how were you stationed, and where on 
this fourteenth car¥ 
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A. \Yell, I was in the middle of the car before, 
and, as it proceeded down, why I proceeded 
to the end of the car in order to get down. 
Q. \Yhich end, the east or west end~ 
A. The east end of the car. 
Q. Where was the side ladder that you were 
going down~ 
~\. It's on the south end, southerly direction. 
:jj: * =II< * 
Q. Be on the south side at the east end~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: That be the right side looking 
forward? 
A. Yes, the right side. 
Q. On the engineer's side~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you have hold of anything before the 
slack action came~ 
A. Yes, I had hold of my lantern and brake club, 
and, if I recall correctly, I had hold of the 
grab, the top grab iron on top of the car. 
Q. Where is that grab iron with reference to 
the side ladder~ 
A. It is on top of the car. 
Q. Directly above the side ladder~ 
A. Yes, a little ways north, to the left of the 
car, in order that you can get up on. 
A JUROR: Did-is this permissible Y 
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THE COURT: If you suggest the question 
to me, maybe we could-
A JUROR: On this grab iron that is down, 
would you have to be kneeling to have hold of 
that grab iron; that is, it is up if you are on top 
of the car~ 
Q. Describe this grab iron on top of the car 
you have mentioned. 
A. Grab iron on top of the car, there is, there is 
a grab iron made in an 'L' position, held in 
with brackets, and it is secured there so that, 
when you're climbing on top, ascending or 
descending either the side ladder or the end 
ladder, that, when you reach the top, that 
you can grab hold of this grab iron and go 
immediately on up. When you are descend-
ing from the top of the car, you grab the grab 
iron in order to descend either to the side of 
the ladder or the end ladder, and you have 
to be in crouched position descending the 
top of the car. 
THE COURT: What he wants to know, I 
think, is how far above the top of the car does the 
grab iron project~ 
A. Well, roughly, I would say four inches above 
the top of the car. 
Q. Now, did you testify that you did or that 
you didn't have hold of this grab iron just 
before the slack action came~ 
A. I don't really recall whether I had hold of 
the grab iron with my left hand or not. 
Q. How were you carrying your lantern and the 
brake club at that time, which hand~ 
A. Think I was carrying them in my right hand. 
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Q. Had both of then1 in your right hand~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. \r as your body and feet still on top of the 
car at the time the action took place~ 
A. Yes, I believe so. 
Q. Before this movement commenced; that was 
after all the switching had taken place and 
at the time that you gave the proceed signal 
from on top of the .car out near the ice house, 
did you know what the movement was going 
to be~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. .And what was that movement to be~ 
A. \Ye was to continue out on the ice house or 
stock track to the main line, and line the 
mainline switch and back up the cut of cars 
westward to the remainder of the train, and 
couple the air a~d line the switches, the de-
rail, and the ice house switch, and go on to 
town. 
Q. \Vhen that movement commenced, what was 
the condition of these two switches, the main-
line switch and the stock ice house track 
switch~ 
A. They were all lined for the ice house track. 
Q. And would it have been necessary to throw 
either of these switches in order to permit 
that train to move clear out on the main line~ 
A. In eastward direction~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, they were already lined for that move-
ment. 
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Q. And where did you expect the train to be 
stopped when it made the first stop after 
movement commenced~ 
A. East of the mainline switch, in order that I 
could line the mainline switch. 
Q. Well, stop of the fourteenth car there, car 
you were on, was to the east of the mainline 
switch~ 
A. Yes." (R. 144-155) 
On cross examination the plaintiff gave other pertin-
ent testimony on the matter of liability. At Record, page 
165, he testified that he had participated in switching 
operations at Buena Vista before his injury and on 
numerous occasions had ridden and performed his duties 
from the tops of cars in switching movements at that 
place. On the occasion of his injury he was the only 
trainman on the cut of cars and the movement was under 
his direction. At Record, page 169, he testified: 
'' Q. And why were you riding in the center of the 
car~ 
A. Because that's the place to ride in case of-
well, it is a safety rule that you are to ride 
in the center of the car. 
Q. That is a safe place to ride, isn't it~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why is it a safe place to ride~ 
A. Well, if anything happens that you go in 
emergency, or there is slack action that you 
could move either direction without being 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
thrown off, I n1ean, you have a chance to 
catch your balance before you are thrown.'' 
~-\.fter the plaintiff passed the proceed signal it be-
came his duty to dismount from the train as the east 
end of the last car approached the main line switch. 
Plaintiff remained where he was stationed when the pro-
ceed signal was given until the car upon which he was 
stationed was approaching the derail and then he started 
forward on the running board of the car for the purpose 
of dismounting. 
On recross examination plaintiff testified that brake-
men riding the tops of cars out of the ice house and 
passing tracks toward the main line usually got down 
just before they reached the main road crossing which 
is indicated on the map, Exhibit "D ". Plaintiff ex-
pected that the train would not be slowed down at all 
until the fourth or fifth car was out on the main line. 
The slack action which caused him to be thrown from 
the train was much more severe than the ordinary slack 
action developed in the movement of trains in switching 
operations. 
From plaintiff's deposition taken by defendant, the 
following questions and answers were read into the 
Record (R. 184, 185) : 
'' Q. How do you know the slack ran in? 
A. \Yell, that is the only thi~g that could have 
happened. 
Q. \Vhat visible signs were there? 
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A. A violent running in and a run out. There 
is a down-grade and when he puts the air to 
these cars, he used the independent air; when 
he puts the air to the diesel, the diesel is the 
only braking power he had; in other words, 
that he used. Up and down hill grade, and 
going at the speed he was going, and the 
weight of the diesel, as heavy as it is, when 
he puts air to that, if he puts too much, why 
there will be a violent slack action running 
in on the cars.'' 
The witness, F. H. Green, testified that he was a 
combination trainmaster and road foreman not in the 
employ of the defendant; that he was acquainted with 
and had operated its diesel engines; that the approxi-
mate length of a four-unit diesel was 194 feet between 
the couplers and that such an engine would weigh ap-
proximately 460 tons; that these engines are equipped 
with independent brakes which operate on the trucks 
of the diesel only and also automatic brakes that operate 
the brakes on all of the train as well as on the engine ; 
that the independent air brakes can be applied in either 
of two positions, one a slow application and the other 
a quick application; and that there are eight sets of 
trucks of four wheels each on a four-unit diesel, all sub-
ject to the power of the independent air brakes exerted 
through 32 cylinders and 32 pistons. On a steam engine 
there are either two or four brakes controlled by the 
independent brakes dependent on the type of engine. 
The grade at Buena Vista is a one per cent grade de-
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scending eastward. At Record, page 124, the witness 
testified: 
· '' Q. Does the slack action depend upon the move-
ment of the locomotive' 
A. Yes, it depends on a changing of the speed 
of the different portions of the train. 
Q. Well, would this be true, that whatever slack 
action there was on the rear end of the train 
would be caused by the motion of the engine' 
A. Yes ; whatever slack action at the rear would 
be caused by changing the speed of the loco-
motive.'' 
The witness, R. J. Intchauspe, testified that he was 
the fireman on the diesel handling the train at Buena 
Vista upon which the plaintiff was working when in-
jured; that he had been a fireman since 1937 and had 
worked on both steam and diesel locomotives ; that as 
the train pulled out of the ice house tracks he was look-
ing out of the window on the left side of the diesel and 
.observed a high proceed signal from a trainman located 
on top of a car; that it was dark and the signal was made 
by a lighted lantern; that the engineer released the air 
and started forward and as the train was rolling out 
toward the main line he kept looking back for signals ; 
that the locomotive would naturally roll the freest on 
the tracks at Buena Vista if th~ movement was toward 
the east as the diesel was equipped with roller-bearing 
wheels (R. 202) and therefore thk locomotive would exert 
pulling power on the cars as the train moved toward the 
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main line; that when the locomotive reached a point near 
that marked I-3 on Exhibit ''D'' he lost sight of the light 
on the rear car and reported this fact to the engineer, 
and the engineer applied the air immediately and almost 
came to a stop and then released the air and the train 
moved forward onto the main line until the rear end 
cleared the road crossing. 
Operating Rule No. 13 was received in evidence and 
read to the jury (R. 207). It states: 
''Employes giving signals must locate them-
selves so as to be plainly seen, and if signal dis-
appears movement must be stopped until signal 
is again visible. Trainmen and enginemen must 
use care to avoid acting on wrong signals.'' 
D. K. MOORE testified that he was employed by the 
defendant as a brakeman and conductor and that he was 
acquainted with the yards at Buena Vista, Colorado and 
had performed his duties there on numerous occasions. 
He was rear brakeman on the train upon which plaintiff 
was working when injured. 
On the rna tter of train slack in a train of fourteen 
cars the witness testified (R. 211): 
"Q. Well, all right, tell the jury about how much 
slack you think there would be in fourteen 
cars. 
A. Well, on a grade like that, there would be, 
there would have been enough to knock you 
around on top of the cars, whenever it run 
in or run out. 
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Q. Can you tell us about how much play there 
is~ 
A. I would say eight to twelve inches on each 
car." 
In describing slack action Moore testified as follows 
(R. 211, 212, 213, 21 ±, 215) : 
"Q. Xow, what happens when a train is moving 
down a grade of about one per cent at three 
to four, five to six, or ten to twelve, fifteen 
miles an hours at Buena Vista, and the speed 
of the locomotive is checked~ 
A. The cars run in, there will be a jerk on the 
rear end. 
Q. Would that jerk on the rear end, would that 
slack action be perceptible to the crew of the 
engine~ 
A. I don't think so; I never noticed when I was 
riding the engine; the diesel is pretty heavy. 
Q. I see. Now, if the speed of the engine were 
checked while the cars were running, would 
there be any spring action following the 
running in of the slack~ 
A. There is a certain amount of that, yes. 
Q. Can you describe the effect of that spring 
action on the rear car~ 
A. Well, it is hard to describe slack action or 
spring action, whatever you call it, but it 
will run in, then stretch out again, do that 
on level ground.'' 
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'' Q. I see. Well, what would be the effect of that 
action on the rear cut of a cut of fourteen 
cars, in your opinion~ 
A. Well, it would mean the biggest jolt; it would 
mean the biggest jar. It is like the end of a 
whip. 
Q. What effect would it have upon a brakeman 
stationed upon the rear car of fourteen-unit 
train~ 
* * * * 
A. Didn't watch himself, he would get knocked 
off. 
Q. Do you have any instructions ·as to the posi-
tion the trainman must take if he was giving 
signals from on top of a car~ 
A. No, sir, you don't have any definite position, 
take just wherever he can pass signals. There 
is no safe place on top of box car when it is 
moving. 
Q. There is no safe place~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Why is that~ 
A. Slack action is bad always, especially with a 
diesel. 
* * * * 
Q. What do you mean, 'they are more severe on 
a diesel~' 
A. Well, there is brakes on every wheel. When 
they set, they stop. There is a lot of weight 
there on the steam engine. It is just on the 
drivers and the tender all I know; I don't 
know mechanical part of engine, but I do 
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know action on top of car when they set 
brakes on a diesel, you have to be awful care-
ful. 
Q. How does the slack produced by sudden slow-
ing of the engine on train moving five or 
six miles an hour compare in severity with 
slack action produced on train moving 
twelve, fifteen n1iles an hour? 
A. Not much different; of course, slower train 
moving, harder jolt will be. 
• • '* • 
Q. Now, are you acquainted with the practice 
of dismounting, if there is-is there a prac-
tice with respect to the place where the brake-
man starts to dismount from the train. 
* * * * 
A. Well, if you was going to prepare to get the 
switch, the main line switch, you would have 
to get down four, five, or six car-lengths to 
be at the bottom rung of the ladder to drop 
off at the switch; otherwise, go beyond 
switch, and have to walk back." 
M. C. FEATHER testified that he was a railroad 
brakeman and conductor employed by the defendant, and 
that he was acquainted with the yards and tracks at 
Buena Vista and had assisted in switching cars at that 
point on numerous occasions. At Record, pages 219, 220, 
221, 222 and 223, he testified: 
"Q. Are you acquainted with what is known to 
railroaders as 'slack action'~ 
A. All brakemen are acquainted with slack ac-
tion; yes, I am. 
* * • • 
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Q. Having in mind a situation where a four-unit 
diesel was handling fourteen cars, the move-
ment commencing at a time when the diesel 
engine was, maybe, from 150 to 250 feet west 
of the cross-over connecting the stock ice 
house track with the passing track, that, 
while the train was standing at that point, 
the engine crew received a proceed signal 
from a brakeman standing at the top of the 
fourteenth car, the brakes on the diesel were 
released and the diesel, together with the 
train, started rolling toward the east and 
toward the mainline track, that when the 
diesel engine had reached a point just on the 
mainline track and a short distance to the 
east of the mainline switch, that the speed of 
the engine was suddenly arrested by the ap-
plication of the independent brakes on the 
diesel when the speed of the train at that 
time was somewhere between four and twelve, 
fourteen, fifteen miles an hour, would you 
have any opinion as to whether or not the 
slowing of the engine would produce any 
slack action on the fourteenth car~ 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. Do you have any opinion as to the nature of 
that slack action~ 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. Will you state your opinion~ 
A. My opinion is that there would be a severe 
run-in of the slack first; that is, the cars 
would tend to run into the diesel, . and, due 
to this spring action-and, you say, he then 
released the air~ 
Q. Yes. 
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~\.. Due to the spring· action at the couplers, 
draw-bars, draft gear, and releasing the air 
on the diesel to let it start rolling again, 
there would be a running out of the slack 
Q. And what effect would that slack action have 
upon a trainman stationed upon that four-
teenth car~ 
* * * * 
A. \Yell, you would get a double jolt; you would 
get a run-in and run-out; it would get you 
one way, then slam you the other. I haven't 
been knocked off a car, but I have been 
knocked down on a car many times. 
* * * * 
Q. In the causing and producing of slack action 
in trains being moved by diesels and by 
steamers, do you-is there any difference in 
that slack action produced by these two types 
of locomotives~ 
A. In a high speed movement, train movement, 
there probably would not be, but in low speed 
or switching movement, there is much more 
severe slack in using diesel than it is in 
using steam engine. 
Q. And why is that~ 
A. From observation, I would say it's from the 
fact that the diesel engine is on roller bear-
ings, and freight cars are all on friction bars, 
and diesel has tendency to run away from 
them; starts, sets up a condition where slack 
action kinda curve, than where straight ac-
tion, each wheel having own brake cylinder 
and action.'' 
J. A. WILLS, of· Buena Vista, a witness called by 
defendant, testified that he was a telegraph operator 
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at Buena Vista. His testimony on cross-examination 
amply supports the proposition that there was a rather 
rapid slowing down of the train at about the time plain-
tiff was injured. He testified that he was inside the depot 
at the window and saw the engine and fourteen cars 
go by; that it was dark and the lights from the depot 
illuminated the train; that when the engine first came 
into his view opposite the window it was traveling from 
twelve to fifteen miles an hour but when the rear end 
came into view it was traveling about eight miles per 
hour (R. 309, 310). 
There is an entire want and lack of any evidence 
whatsoever of plaintiff's contributory negligence in 
the Record. Proof of contributory negligence does not 
exist here. There is Iio evidence from which an in-
ference of contributory negligence can be deduced. The 
case simply stated is this: 
Charles L. Bennett, the plaintiff, stationed him-
self upon the running board near the center of the top 
of the fourteenth car from the locomotive for the pur-
pose of passing signals to the engineer. He was re-
quired to so station himself not only under uniform 
practice, but because the train movement could only be 
made upon proper signals from the train crew to the 
engineer and plaintiff's position on top of the car was 
the only position from which signals could be passed to 
the engineer. After the signal was passed it became 
plaintiff's duty to dismount. In the performance of 
this duty he walked forward to the ·front end of the 
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car to go down the side ladder located there. He did 
not stumble or fall or do any other thing which could 
be designated as a negligent act or omission. He stooped 
over to grasp the handhold on top of the car above the 
ladder, this act was necessary. While so situated the 
violent jarring occurred which dislodged him, threw 
him from the car and caused his injury. If there is 
one scintilla of evidence in this record of contributory 
negligence, the appellant should point it out. It has 
not done so in its brief, it could not do so in the trial 
court, and we know it cannot do so now. We say to the 
Court that this record may be canvassed and scrutinized 
with the greatest of care in every part and portion 
thereof without disclosing a single scintilla of evidence 
to support the trial court in ~ubmitting the issue of 
contributory negligence to the jury or support the jury's 
verdict diminishing plaintiff's ,damages in the amount 
of $20,000.00 on account of contributory negligence. · 
(b) DAMAGES 
Immediately following the occurrence which re-
sulted in plaintiff's injury a doctor and an ambulance 
were summoned. The doctor gave him two hypos and 
he was placed in an ambulance and a tourniquet was 
placed on his arm. He was then taken to Salida. Be-
fore the doctor arrived he suff~red much pain as could 
be reasonably expected (R. 156). He likewise suf-
fered severe pain during the trip from Buena Vista to 
the hospital at Salida. He never lost consciousness 
at any time. After arriving at the hospital his arn1 
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was amputated near the shoulder. He remained in the 
hospital eleven days. During all of the period of his 
convalescence he suffered continuously from pain. In 
describing his pain the plaintiff stated (R. 156, 157): 
"A. Well, I have a throbbing sensation in the 
stump of my arm, and, and it is, throbs al-
most continously. It is a very uneasy feeling, 
and, at first, I had a shocking sensation af-
ter I was released from the hospital. It 
was a sensation that if you put your, this 
left, when I put my left arm in certain po-
sitions, it was more or less like an electric 
shock; it went through my body." 
About two months after the injury another portion 
of plaintiff's right arm was amputated and plaintiff 
was under the care of the doctor at the time of the 
trial. 
Plaintiff Is naturally righthanded. In describing 
his difficulties due to the loss of his right arm, plaintiff 
stated (R. 158, 159) : 
"A. It is impossible for me to tie my own shoes 
and for me to wash underneath my arm-pit 
at the left arm and for me to wash my elbow 
or the back of my hand; that's impossible 
for me to do, and I have great difficulty 
in buttoning my shirt and trousers and for 
cutting meat; I can't cut meat unless it is 
awful tender and I can cut it with a fork; 
and writing, I haven't, being righthanded 
as I was before, I didn't never write left-
handed before. I have a very difficult time 
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in writing, then I have nothing to hold the 
paper .. with. In order to write, somebody 
has to hold the paper in order for me to 
write. 
Q. 'Yha t about reading books, news p ape r s, 
things of that kind~ 
A. "~ell, I have quite a difficulty in turning the 
the page and holding it and reading-I mean, 
there's, you can't hold the paper out; you 
just have to hold it in the middle or get 
down over the paper, or other ways, reading 
that way. 
Q. What about dressing yourself, putting on 
your shirt and clothes, things of that kind~ 
A. It is very difficult. 
Q. Do you know of any employment that you 
could get at this time in your physical condi-
tion that would yield you a living or an in-
come~ 
A. No, I don't. 
Q. Are you in a condition at this time, as far 
as you know, to earn any money~ 
A. No, I'm not at the present time." 
In speaking of his earnings, plaintiff testified 
(R. 128): 
'' Q. What was your rate of pay at the time you 
were injured, Charles~ 
A. Well, about $350 a month. 
Q. About what~ 
A. About $350 a month. 
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Q. Tell the jury your hourly or daily wage rate 
you were drawing a.t that time~ 
A. At the time that I was hurt, it was 11.55 a 
hundred. We go by mileage instead of hour-
ly basis, and it was 11.55 a hundred; then 
it is time and a half for overtime after the 
eight hours. 
Q. And, having in mind the five or six or eight 
months prior to the time of your injury, 
will you state your average earnings earned 
during that period, approximately, best you 
can~ 
A. By the month~ 
Q. Yes, by the month~ 
A. It was 350, approximately." 
DR. REED S. CLEGG, an orthopedic surgeon, 
testified with respect to the injured arm as follows 
(R. 229, 230) : 
"A. There has been an amputation of this right 
upper extremity, with approximately a five-
inch, as we call it, stump, with some irregu-
larity of the soft tissues over the boned 
ends, and some tightness and pressure over 
these parts and to the end of the stump. 
There is still some redness of the scar here, 
which indicates irritation. 
Q. Now, Doctor, the plaintiff has indicated that 
after the first operation, there was a second 
operation~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Do you know what that operation was~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. \Yill you explain to the jury what the nature 
of that operation was~ 
A. There was persistent drainage following the 
first operation, and his physician felt it 
necessary to explore and remove some pieces 
of dead bone, and to trim the bone contour, 
make it a better stwnp, *" 
And eontinuing at Record, page 231: 
"Q. Now, regarding the- I think you indi-
cated that the arm has not healed as yet1 
A. That is correct. 
Q. \\; ould you give us your prognosis as to that; 
what you expect to see in the future1 
A. \Veil, I feel that there will still be another 
operation necessary.'' 
And, in regard to pain and suffering, he testified (R. 
232, 233): 
"Q. I see. Now, Doctor, in regard to-I with-
draw that. Do you know whether he is suf-
fering from any pains as a result of his 
present condition 1 
A. I have an opinion. 
Q. Will you give that opinion 1 
A. Yes, sir; I believe that he still has some 
pain in his stump. 
Q. He testified here, Doctor, that when he moved 
his arm, he felt like he had an electric shock 
enter his body1 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. Could you explain that~ 
A. In amputations, we sometimes have impinge-
ment of the nerve or little nerve growth 
called neuroma, which will cause touches of 
pain. It may or may not be permanent. 
Q. You sa.y it may or may not be permanent? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You can't give us an opinion as to whether 
it will or will not~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Doctor, have you an opinion as to what dis-
ability he suffered from this arm injury' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What~ 
A. One hundred per cent of his right upper 
extremity. 
Q. When you say 'one hundred per cent of his 
right upper extremity,' you mean the right 
arm~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In its entirety~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You have experience-have you had ex-
perience here in this territory with artificial 
arms that are supplied in this area to men 
who had amputations~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Have you an opinion, from your experience, 
as to whether or not an artificial arm could 
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be provided in this territory which would 
give him any help~ 
A. He can be fitted with a limb that will fill 
out the contour of his clothing, but will not 
be very practical as a functioning unit." 
(c) THE TABLES. 
WILLIA~I E. ~tfYRICK, Trust Officer of the First 
Security Trust Company, who had qualified as an in-
vestment analyst and as an expert in the investment 
field, stated as follows (R. 186, 187) : 
'' Q. From your experience and training and the 
knowledge gained from observation in read-
ing market reports and the like, will ask 
you to state if you have any opinion as to 
the highest rate of return that a person of 
ordinary prudence, without special training 
in investment field, could hope to obtain on 
safe investments here in this part of the 
country? 
A. Yes, I have an opinion. 
Q. You have an opinion; will you state it, please? 
A. It is my opinion that investor investing funds 
where he doesn't have training or experience 
would adhere to pur.chasing investments of 
high investment rating, preferably bonds. 
With such types of investments in the pres-
ent market, his return would vary somewhere 
between two and a half and three per cent, 
depending on the diversification as to type 
of security and maturities that were se-
lected.'' 
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RAY G. WOOD, a Certified Public Accountant, 
testified that he had prepared Exhibit "G'' and that 
in doing so he had used the American Experience Tables 
of Mortality for the purpose of determining the life 
expectancy of the attained age group, age 26 (R. 236, 
237), and that the tables indica ted a life expectancy 
of such group to be 38.12 years, which reduced to months 
was 457 months, and that in making the compilation he 
used and employed information contained in said tables, 
and used and employed discount rates of 234, 3, 3lf2, 4, 5, 
and 6%, and that he had used annuity per month pay-
ments of $1, $10, $25, $50, $100, $200, and $300. He like-
wise testified that the exhibit was mathematically correct 
(R. 238, 244) and that he had cross-checked and tested the 
mathematical accuracy of the tables (R. 246). 
Mr. Wood further testified (R. 256) that he had 
used a hook published by the Financial Publishing Com-
pany containing compound interest and annuity tables 
and that the book was used by the First Security Trust 
Company of Salt Lake City in computing interest and 
annuities and that he had spot-checked them with other 
books that are used by certified public accountants and 
that they checked and were in agreement. He also 
used a book known as ''Mathematics of Finance'' by 
McKenzie, published by McGraw Hill Book Company, 
and that he had examined the mathematical formula 
used in the computation of figures and tables and that 
it was accurate. From his own examination and cal-
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culations he was willing to state that the tables were 
mathematically correct and that they truthfully and 
properly reflect the true state of facts with reference 
to the present value of the amounts stated, discounted 
at the amounts stated, over the periods of time stated. 
Upon this foundation Exhibit "G" was received in 
evidence ( R. 258). 
On cross-examination (R. 260) he stated that he 
had checked the Accountants' Handbook approved by 
the American Institute of Accountants against the in-
formation contained in ''Mathematics of Finance'' by 
McKenzie, the book used in the preparation of Exhibit 
"G" and they were in agreement. He further testi-
fied that the mathematical tables were standard and 
that they were used by actuaries (R. 261). The witness 
likewise, on voir dire examination (R. 266), stated that 
he had proved the table and that he could prove it 
"right now." The Court asked Mr. Wood the follow-
ing question (R. 267): 
''THE COURT : Did I understand you to say 
that there is a standard work accepted by 
people in your profession as such 1 
A. Oh, yes; yes, sir. 
THE COURT : I don't believe you made that 
statement with resp/ect to the other book, 
which you may have done; is it so that this 
other book referred to-would you give us 
the title to it, Mr. McCarthy 1 
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MR. l\icCARTHY: Mathematics of Finance. 
THE COURT: -is likewise a standard work 
used by people in your profession for the 
purposes which you use it in connection with 
these computations~ 
A. Yes, sir.'' 
Mr. Wood stated that he had likewise prepared 
Exhibit "H" and in connection with that exhibit stated 
as follows (R. 271, 272): 
''A. The tables referred to on Exhibit H are taken 
from a publication called UNITED STATES 
LIFE TABLES, covering the years 1939 to 
1941. These were published-or this was 
published-by the Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census in Washington, D. C. 
Q. "\Vhen was it published~ 
A. January the 11th, 1944. 
Q. And do you know whether or not the in-
formation contained there was prepared by 
the Department of Commerce of the United 
States Government? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. The tables that you have, that were pub-
lished by the United States Department of 
Commerce, are they broken down more com-
pletely than the tables in the American Ex-
perience Tables of Mortality for white males 
and white females and-
A. Black. 
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Q. -and colored and so forth 1 
~\.. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you know whether or not the basis 
of the table includes all of the citizens of 
eYery kind, and of all professions and all 
occupations t 
A. That is the explanation of the table. They 
cover all people within the group born alive. 
Q. All those that are born alive ; do the tables 
show anything with respect to the life ex-
pectancy of the 26-year-old adult age group 
of white males 1 
A. According to these tables, a person who is 
a ·white male, who has attained the age of 
26 years, has 42.38 average number of years 
of life remaining to him. 
Q. Have you used that life expectancy, 42.38 
years in a compilation of the figures set 
forth in Exhibit H1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that amounts to, as I understand it, 
509 months1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Now, in preparing the compilation on Ex-
hibit H, did you use the same sources of an-
nuity information that you have described 
to the court and jury in connection with Ex-
hibit G1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And do you know whether or not the tables, 
Exhibit H, are mathematically correct 1 
A. Yes, sir, they are." 
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SUMMARY OF RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT 
IN ANSWER TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS AMPLY SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JURY'S FINDING OF LIABILITY UNDER DOC-
TRINES ANNOUNCED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND BY THIS COURT. 
POINT II. 
BEFORE THE VERDICT CAN BE VACATED DEFEN-
DANT MUST ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS SO EXCESSIVE AS 
TO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLU-
ENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT III. 
EXHIBITS "G" AND "H" WERE PROPERLY ADMIT-
TED IN EVIDENCE AND THE FOUNDATIONAL BASIS 
FOR SAID EXHIBITS WAS AMPLE AND SUFFICIENT 
UNDER THE AUTHORITIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS AMPLY SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE JURY'S FINDING OF LIABILITY UNDER DOC-
TRINES ANNOUNCED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND BY THIS COURT. 
The evidence in this case, without dispute, reveals 
that plaintiff stationed himself on top of the fourteenth 
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car from the locomotiYe ·where it was necessary for him 
to be in order to pass Yisible signals to the engineer. 
The engineer was operating the engine and train upon 
signals from plaintiff. Unless an obstruction appeared 
on the track creating an emergency, the engineer would 
not be expected to stop or slow down suddenly ·except 
in res·ponse to a compelling signal from plaintiff or 
another member of the crew. The evidence reveals, with-
out any dispute whatsoever, that neither the plaintiff nor 
any 'Other member of the crew gave a ''stop'' or ''slow 
down'' signal to the engineer at or near the time when 
plaintiff was thrown from his position on the car. 
\Yhile plaintiff was \Yalking forward and stooping 
over to grasp the handhold on top of the car prepara-
tory to dismounting, he was dislodged and thrown from 
the car as the direct result of a violent jerking of the 
train. 
The plaintiff, 1n describing the movement, stated 
(R. 184): 
''A. A violent running in and a run out. There is a 
down-grade and when he puts the air to these 
cars, he used the independent air; when he 
;puts the air to the diesel, ·the diesel is the 
only braking power he had; in other words, 
that he used. Up and down hill grade, and 
going at the speed he was going, and the 
weight of the diesel, as heavy as it is, when 
he puts the air to that, if he puts too much, 
why there will be a violent slack action run-
ning in on the cars.'' 
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The engineer and the fireman testified that a vio-
lent jerk of the car could only occur as a direct result 
of some manipulation on the part of the engineer. The 
jury, as required by its oath under the evidence, found 
that there was a sudden, unexpected, entirely unneces-
sary jerking of the car which resulted in plaintiff's ter-
rible injuries. 
Defendant has not seriously dis1puted liability in this 
case, although belittling certain recent decisi·ons of the 
Supreme Court of the United S.tates which are here con-
trolling. However, in order that there may be absolutely 
no doubt as to the strength of plaintiff's case on liabil-
ity, we wish to review controlling authorities. This court 
has consistently held that a sudden, severe and unex-
pected jerk in the movement of a train causing a mem-
ber of the train crew to suffer injury or death, consti-
tutes negligence under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act. 
Ward v. Denver & R. G. W. R. R. Co., 96 Utah 564, 
85 P. (2d) 837, plaintiff brought action for the wrongful 
death of her husband under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act. She complained that by reason of a sudden 
and unexpected decrease in the speed of the cut upon 
which her husband was riding and resulting jerk, he was 
thrown from the car upon which he was stationed and 
fatally injured. There was no eyewitness who could or 
did testify that there was a sudden jerk. Expert wit-
nesses were produced who testified that a jerk could 
reasonably be expected from the movement of a cut of 
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cars as described by other witnesses. The court, after 
reviewing the evidence stated: 
'' * * * The jury could conclude that there 
\H1S negligence in slowing down the cars too 
quickly after they had acquired a s,peed too fast 
to permit hin1 to make the cut ,as they passed him. 
The speed was in response to his signals. The 
foreman knew, or should have known, that Ward 
was upon the cars; \Yard's duty called him there 
in obedience to the foreman's orders. He knew, 
or should have known, that Ward was in a posi-
tion of danger; that a quick, or too rapid, slow-
ing of the cars might throw him off, by reason 
of the momentum of the cars; that the slack run-
ning through the cars would heighten the risk 
and the danger. He also knew, or should have 
known, that \Yard would not anticipate any slow-
ing or jerking of the cars at 'Such juncture. 
''Under the evidence in the record, it eannot 
be said, as matter of law, that there was no evi-
dential support for the jury's conclusion that the 
sudden slowing of the cars jerked Ward off the 
train and that such jerking was negligence. That 
there was no eyewitness as to when Ward actually 
reached the top of the end car, or when he went 
off of it, is not a sufficient objection. Facts and 
circumstances often speak more convincingly than 
words.'' 
The trial court instructed the jury as follows : 
" * * * if you find from the evidence that 
Ward was directed by the foreman to climb the 
cars in question; that he did so in obedience to 
said directions; that he fell from one of the cars 
by reason of an unusual or unexpected slowing of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
the movement, if such was the •proximate cause 
of the accident, it would constitute negligence on 
the part of defendant for which the plaintiff 
would have the right to recover damage." 
Appellant complained of this instruction and as-
signed it as error on the ground "(1) that it is not un-
lawful, in the absence of a sta~tute or ordinance, to slow 
down cars in switching them.'' But this court held that 
the objection was not well taken and stated: 
"In order that an a0t may be negligent be-
cause imprudent, in the circumstances, such act 
need not also be unlawful because prohibited by 
statute or ordinance.'' 
In the case of J( eeton v. Thompson, 66 S. Ct. 135, 
reversing the Supreme Court of Arkansas, 183 S. W. 
( 2d) 505, action was brought for wrongful death under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act and amongst other 
things the complaint alleged that the intestate, while 
working as a conductor on defendant's train ~through the 
negligence of defendant and its engineer, was knocked 
off and caused to fall from said train and fatally in-
jured; that deceased was riding upon one of the cars of 
said train while it was being moved and the engineer, 
knowing deceased was on the train, carelessly and negli-
gently and without signal 'Or warning suddenly and 
violently stopped the engine and the cars with a hard, 
sudden, violent and unusual jerk and jar, thereby throw-
ing deceased from the ·train. The tdal court submitted 
the issues to the jury. The Supreme Court of Arkansas 
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reversed and the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari and reversed the State Supreme 
Court. 
The facts are interesting here and for ~that reason 
will be set forth in considerable detail. The crew with 
which intestate was working when injured was engaged 
in switching cars from Braggs, Oklahoma, to Camp Gru-
ber, a distance of about a mile and a half, and con-
sisted of an engineer, fireman, deceased the conductor, 
and .two brakemen; at the time of the accident the crew 
was pushing six cars of sand and gravel ahead of the 
engine and deceased was riding on the fifth car ahead 
of the engine, sitting astride of the right or south side 
of an ordinary coal car on the forward end with one 
foot on the gravel and the 'Other on a grab-iron on the 
outside with a switch list in one hand and ·a lighted lan-
tern in the other. On the way down they had to pick up 
an empty car which necessitated the making of .a coup-
ling to the forward loaded car; in making the coupling, 
intestate fell from the car on which he was riding, re-
sulting in his injury and death. Each and every member 
of the train crew except Keeton testified that the train 
was brought to a complete stop about a hu!ldred feet 
from the empty car and that thereafter the engine pushed 
the loaded cars up to the empty :to make the coupling at 
a rate of one or two miles per hour at ·the signal of 
brakeman Vaughn; and that the_ coupling was very light 
and easy and not out of the ordinary in any way. The 
engineer and fireman testified that it was so easy th8!t 
they felt no jolt or jar in the c~b. Witness Vaughn tes-
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tified that he gave the signal to the engineer to proceed 
to the empty after walking to it and gave the easy signal 
when the front car was about 50 feet away, and that by 
the easy signal the engineer knew they wanted him to 
slow down; that he gave the stop signal when the train 
was about three or four feet from ~the empty and the 
engineer ·stopped as soon as possible and he went about 
two feet after the coupling. He ·said the stop was a very 
ordinary one with a slight jar. When asked on cross-
examination if this coupling was about as hard as he 
ever saw the engineer make, he answered, ''No sir, it 
was a very ordinary one." A little later, in answer to 
a question whether the stop was the hardest he ever 
saw him make there, he answered: "Yes, sir." 
The ·widow testified, over appellant's objections and 
exceptions to a statement made to her by her husband, 
as a dying declaration. She said: "He realized that he 
was very sick and told me he wasn't going to get well. 
He told me how it happened; he said he was sitting on 
the corner and there was a sudden stop -and he was 
jerked off. He was sitting on the corner of the car with 
a switch list in one hand and ·a light in the other; ·there 
was a sudden stop. After he was jerked off, he knew 
nothing more ; just said there was a sudden hard stop 
and he wa<S jerked off.'' 
The Supreme Court of the United St·ates in an opin-
ion which shows that this court did not regard the 
question as close or doubtful, reversed and remanded 
the cause upon a mere citation of controlling decisions 
of that court. 
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This court, in Ayres v. Union Pacific R. Co., _______ _ 
Utah --------, 176 P. (2d) 161, reviewing in considerable 
detail the Ward case and the Keeton case, ·supported 
those cases in definite language. In that ease plaintiff, 
in the performance of his duties, wa:s boarding a caboose 
when he fell across the rails in the path of the moving 
caboose and his right hand was crushed by its wheels. 
A washout signal was given by the foreman when he saw 
plaintiff fall and the caboose was brought to a quick 
stop. Plaintiff described his accident as follows: ''there 
was a jerk, a sudden ·stop or something and off I went.'' 
He testified that he was firmly established on the step 
at the time, grasping grab-irons to hold himself on. The 
other crew members denied that there was such a je;rk or 
stop, and the foreman who saw the accident said the fall 
happened in the plaintiff '.s fumbling efforts to get upon 
the step without raising his foot high enough. The un-
disputed te·stimony was that there was no reason, so f·ar 
as the movement of ·the engine and cabooses was con-
cerned, for ·stopping or jerking the train at the moment 
when the accident occurred. 
It \Yas contended that plaintiff, in order to prevail, 
must have shown the cause of the jerk and that ·such 
cause evinced negligence upon defendant's part. This 
court rejected defendant's contention in the f·ollowing 
language: 
" 'Unexpeeted' or 'unanticipated' is meas-
ured in the light of what was the normal per-
formance of the duty involved, and a jerk or stop 
is unexpected or unanticipated when it was not 
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reasonably to be expected as part of the normal 
performance of that duty. We do not adopt the 
suggestion that has been made, inferentially at 
least, that the mere happening of the jerk or stop 
is sufficient proof to submit to the jury, but when 
the jerk ·Or stop is characterized by tes,timony tak-
ing it out of the normal incident to the perform-
ance of the duty involved, it becomes an issue for 
the jury to determine. The Ward case, this case, 
and ·the Keeton case are examples of jerks and 
stops that vary from the normal.'' 
See also Western & Atlantic R. Co .. v. Gardner, 74 Ga. 
App. 499, 40 S. E. (2d) 672. 
It is clear that the jerk in the case at bar was un-
expected and unanticipated, was clearly characterized 
by all of the evidence as not being ''the normal incident 
to the performance of the duty involved.'' 
It is respectfully submitted that defendant was lia-
ble to plaintiff for his injuries and that the finding of 
the jury ·on this issue was consis•tent with the proof and 
that the proof furnished a strong evidentiary basis for 
the verdict. 
POINT II. 
BEFORE THE VERDICT CAN BE VACATED DEFEN-
DANT MUST ESTABLISH THAT IT WAS SO EXCESSIVE AS 
TO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN GIVEN UNDER THE INFLU-
ENCE OF PASSION AND PREJUDICE AND THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
THE MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
The fundamental proposition raised by defendant in 
its Point III is that an excessive verdict was returned 
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in this case. Whether this court will interfere with the 
:verdict upon this ground has been considered in many 
cases and governing rules have been definitely estab-
lished. In Pa~tly u. JlcCarthy et al, 166 Pac. (2d) 501, 
67 S. Ct. 102, 184 P. (2d) 123; 109 Utah 398, 436, the rule 
is stated: 
"Where we can say, as a matter of law, that 
the verdict was so excessive as to appear to have 
been given under the influence of passion or pre-
judice, and the trial court abused its discretion or 
acted arbitrarily or capriciously in denying a mo-
tion for a new trial, we may order the verdict set 
aside, and a new trial granted. Jensen v. D. & R. 
G. Ry. Co., supra; and other cases cited above 
following that decision. But mere excessiveness 
of a 'Terdict, without more, does not necessarily 
show that the verdict was arrived at by passion 
or prejudice. Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. 
U. P. Ry. Co., supra. It is true that ·the verdict 
might be so grossly excessive and disproportion-
ate to the injury that we could say from that fact 
alone that as a matter of law the verdict must 
have been arrived at by passion or ·prejudice. But 
the facts must be such that the excess can be de-
termined as a matter of law, or the verdict must 
be so excessive as to be shocking to one's con-
science and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice, 
or corruption on the part of the jury. McAfee v. 
Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra; Ward v. 
D. & R. G. w·. Ry. Co., ·supra. This is not such a 
case. 
''The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But 
the mere fact that it was more than another 
jury, or more than this court might have given, or 
even more than the evidence justified, does not 
conclusively show that it was the resul·t of pas-
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sion, prejudice, or corruption on the part of 
the jury. * * * 
"The jury is allowed great latitude in as-
sessing damages for personal injuries. Miller v. 
So. Pac. Co., 82 Utah 46, 21 P. 2d 865. The pres-
ent cost of living and the diminished rpurchasing 
power of the dollar may be taken into consider-
ation when estimating damages. Coke v. Timby, 
57 Utah 53, 192 P. 624; McAfee v. Ogden Union 
Ry. & Depot Co., supra.'' 
It is with great reluctance that courts interfere 
with the verdict of juries on the ground of excessiveness. 
In the Pauly case this court pointed out: ''But, although 
we have the power to order a new trial in a case of an 
excessive verdict, it is a power which we have rarely, if 
ever, exercised.'' 
Traditionally courts have adhered to ,the proposi-
tion that the trial court trying the issues and hearing 
the testimony is the proper tribunal for determining 
whether or not the jury's verdict is excessive. The trial 
court exercises a discretionary power over the amount 
of the verdict and the rule is stated in 15 Am. Jur. 622, 
Damages, Sec. 205, as follows: 
''The question of the excessiveness of a ver-
dict is generally one for the determination of the 
trial court in the first instance, and its action 
in granting or refusing to grant a new trial on 
that ground will not be disturbed on appeal un-
less an abuse of discretion is shown.'' 
The defendant in this case invoked the exercise of 
this discretionary power of the trial court. One of the 
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grounds urged by them in their motion for new trial was 
the excessiYeness of the verdict. The trial court denied 
the motion for a new trial thereby ·placing its ~stamp of 
approval upon the verdict as rendered. As stated in 
Stephens Rauclz & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac .. R. Co., 
48 Utah 528, 161 Pac. 459 at 462: 
'' * * * Necessarily upon such a quesHon ap-
pell&te courts must, to a large extent, rely upon 
the judgment and discretion of the trial court. 
That court is in a much better position to observe 
and determine whether a jury was actuated by 
passion or prejudice, 'Or by both, in returning a 
· verdict for an amount larger than the evidence 
justifies, or whether the jury was merely mis-
taken ''ith regard to the amount that should have 
been allowed.'' 
Hence, when defendant came to this court asserting 
that the verdict is greater than the evidence justifies it 
has the burden of convincing that the damages awarded 
were so excessive as to indicate that they were given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice and that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion 
for a new trial. 
It has always been ·our position that $50,000 is a very 
moderate sum of money to compensate a young man, 26 
years of age, for the loss of his right arm at the shoul-
der. This case could not have been settled for that figure 
bef·ore trial. The court will observe that a monthly an-
nuity of $200, discounted at the rate of 234% interest 
over plaintiff's life expectancy of 42.38 years as shown 
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by the United States Life Tables 1939 and 1941, Depart-
ment of Commerce, is $60,053.76, and the jury could well 
have found that plaintiff's pecuniary loss over his life 
expectancy was much greater than a sum based upon a 
$200 per month diminution of earning capacity. We be-
lieve that under the authorities, hereinafter cited, a sum 
of $50,000 for plaintiff's pain ~nd suffering, loss of bod-
ily function and disfigurement alone, would not have 
been excessive. 
In Whittington v. Pennsylvania R. Co .. , (New York, 
July 6, 1944) 55 F. Supp. 1022, 1023, plaintiff was at the 
time of hi~s injuries 39 years of age and steadily em-
ployed as an automobile mechanic, earning approximate-
ly $3,000 a year. His injuries consisted of amputation of 
the left arm, together with a comminuted fracture of the 
eleventh rib near the spine, an impacted fracture of the 
twelfth dorsal vertebra, some paralysis in and about the 
thighs and buttocks, and serious impairment of organs 
of his body. The court, in supporting a jury verdict in 
the amount of $60,000, stated: 
''Reference to the 'Present Value Table,' 
published in Cahill's New York Civil Practice 
Act, discloses that the present value of an ~annu­
ity of $1, payable at the end of each year at 3% 
~per annum compounded over a period of thirty 
years, which wa~s his life expectancy, is $19.60. At 
$3,000 a year the amount would be $58,800, which 
is very close to the verdict of $60,000. That sum, 
thus arrived at, would he without inclusion of 
pain and suffering and the other elements ~that I 
have enumerated above.'' 
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Armentrout t'. rirginia Ry. Co., C\V. Va., Aug. 16, 
1947) 72 F. Supp. 997, 1001, 1003. Plaintiff was a four 
year old boy: his injuries consisted of loss of both arms, 
one above the wrist and the other above the elbow. The 
case was tried before a jury and a verdict rendered in 
favor of the plaintiff f.or $160,000. The court, in sup-
porting the jury's verdict, discussed extensively the var-
ious elements of damage, calling attention to the low pur-
chasing power of money and detailed a computation of 
figures estimating the loss suffered by plaintiff over his 
life expectancy. It will be noted that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to recover for lost wages exc~pt for ,those years 
after he had reached ·the age of 21. The court stated : 
''In seeking to discover whether or not the 
jury were actuated by any im'Proper motives in 
arriving at the ·amount of the verdict, we should 
attempt to measure the monetary value of the dif-
ferent elements of damage which were proper for 
their consideration; bearing in mind the decreased 
value of the dollar, which has nome about very 
rapidly during the past few years. 
"The attention of the jury was not speci-
fically directed to the low purchasing power of 
money, although in my opinion such a suggestion 
by the Court would have been proper, and cer-
tainly the jury were entitled to take that circum-
stance jnto consideration. It may be argued that 
ordinary fluctuations in the purchasing power of 
money may not pro·perly be considered by a jury 
in awarding damages. Perhaps not, as ·to the fu-
ture; but the jury have the right, and it is their 
duty, to be realistic. They need not close their 
eyes to the economic facts of life. It is possible, 
of course, that values may cease to be affected 
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by inflation of the currency. Economic conditions 
may conceivably cause the value of the dollar 
again to rise to the point where it stood before 
World War II. On the 'Other hand, there is no 
assurance that its value may not become less as 
time goes on. This possibility balances, if it does 
not outweigh, the contrary forecast. It would be, 
I think, mere speculation to adopt either ~theory 
as the foundation of an estimate of future earn-
ings. Yet some reasonable and logical basis for 
such an estimate must be found; and, in my opin-
ion, it can be found only by an appraisal of pres-
ent economic facts, of which -the jury are pre-
sumed to have knowledge. No one can say now 
whether a verdict of $160,000 rendered today may 
be equivalent to one of $300,000 or to one of $80,-
000 rendered five years hence. We can be guided 
only by the conditions of the present; and under 
those conditions, we learn from economic statis-
tics that $160,000 now represents a value of a:p-
proximately $100,000 in 1939. See Monthly Labor 
Review, United States Department of Labor, Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, May 1947, p. 879, table 
No. 1; West Virginia Department of Labor Cost 
of Living Survey, 194 7 Prices (Spring) Compared 
with 1940 Prices (Spring) Percent Increase Over 
1940. 
''The jury could, wi·thout overstepping the 
bounds of their province, suppose for ·plaintiff 
a maximum expectancy of 60¥2 years from the 
date of the verdict. This conclusion is based both 
on statements made by counsel during the trial, 
which were not denied or contradicted, and also 
upon a mortality table published by one of the 
large life insurance companies. See Commission-
ers 1941 Standard Ordinary Mortality Table, The 
Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, Newark, 
N. J. By this mortality table the expectancy of a 
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child 4 years old is 60.58 years. While the jury 
were not bound to consider mortality tables, they 
did have the right to do so, and by the fullest ex-
tension of that right they could base their ver-
dict, in my opinion, on ·the full length of expect-
ancy provided in the mortality table as expressed 
to them by counsel in the course of the trial. 
"'With these ~principles in mind I proceed to 
analyze the jury's verdict in the light of the maxi-
mum factors which might properly have gone into 
its synthesis. I say maximum fact·ors because I 
believe that to be the proper te·st after ·the jury 
has acted. Since the jury had the power to extend 
their discretion to its utmost bounds, any less 
than the greatest would not be a fair test as to 
whether or not that power was abused. 
''If by such a test the verdict is found to be 
so excessive that it cannot be justified, it should 
be set aside and a new trial granted, or it should 
be reduced by remittitur to an amount which will 
not exceed the amount of the product of the 
maximum factors. Otherwise, it should be sus-
tained as rendered by the jury.'' 
It would be of distinct interest to the court to examine 
the extensive figures set forth in the ·opinion of this 
case indicating ·the exact method of computing the loss 
suffered. It will also be of interest to note that the court 
considered the sum of $50,000 a maximum reasonable 
amount to which the jury might find the plaintiff en-
titled for pain and suffering, loss of bodily funct1on and 
disfigurement which he had suffered and would suffer 
and endure as a result of his injury. 
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Plaintiff, in the case at bar, suffered the loss of only 
one arm. However, it was within the jury's province as 
finders of the fact and based upon their own e~perience 
as to the business and labor opportunities of a man who 
has lost his right arm to determine whether or not plain-
tiff might potentially be able to earn more than plain-
tiff in the Armentrout case, and it must be borne in mind 
that plaintiff in this case is not well educated; he is a 
young man whose sole experience consists of work in-
volving physical labor and the use of two normal, healthy 
arms and hands. His chances of continuing his employ-
ment as a railroader have been eliminated. 
See Shields et al v. United States (Pa. Mar. 18, 1947) 
73 F. Supp. 862. 
Bartlebaugh v. Pa. R. Co., 78 N. E. (2d) 410 (Ohio 
App. 1948), appeal dismissed, 79 N. E. (2d) 912 (Su-
rpreme Court of Ohio, 1948). Plaintiff was employed as 
a brakeman by defendant company and was injured in 
the course of his employment because of inadequrute 
clearance between adjacent tracks. He lost both legs, 
each being amputated above the knee, the one leaving 
a stump of four inches, and the other, of eight inches 
from the body. The jury found the issues in .favor of 
plaintiff and rendered a verdict for $225,000. The de-
fendant on appeal assigned as error that the damages 
awarded plaintiff were grossly excessive appearing to 
have been given under the influence of sympathy, emo-
tion, passion or prejudice, and that the amount of dam-
ages is not sustained by the evidence. It appeared that 
the plantiff was a young man, 23 years of age at the 
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date of trial and had a life expectancy of 44.77 years. 
The court, in sustaining the verdict, ·stated: 
''Is the award of damages exce.ssive ~ The 
appellant contends that the damages awarded are 
grossly excessive appearing to have been given 
under the influence of sympathy, emotion, pas-
sion or prejudice ; the amount of the damages is 
not sustained by the evidence and is contrary to 
la,·L We have under consideration a general ver-
dict without interrogatories. We are not informed 
as to how the jury arrived at the total award of 
damages. Even if the Court should be of the opin-
ion that on the evidence adduced a lesser amount 
would have been proper, nevertheless the Court 
cannot ·substitute its judgment for that of the 
jury. 30 0. Jur. pp.124, 127; Delaney v. New York 
Central, supra. Before the Court can find the 
damages awarded to be excessive, it must appear 
that the award is so excessive as to manifestly 
show the jury was actuated by pas·sion, pa.rtial-
ity, prejudice or corruption. The damages must 
bQ flagrantly outrageous and extravag,a.nt, other-
wise the Court may not disturb the verdict. 30 0. 
Jur. Section 79, p. 122; Jones v. Adantic Refin-
ing Co., supra. 
"In arriving at its verdict it was the duty 
of the jury to consider several elements of dam-
age which the plaintiff ·suffered: First, the plain-
tiff's earning power. It cannot be assumed that 
his earning tpower would not increase in future 
years. On the evidence adduced the jury had a 
right, to and probably did, f.ind that the earning 
power of the plantiff would Increase. Second, for 
pain and .suffering. The plaintiff had at lea;st two 
operations on his legs which caused him to be 
hospitalized for a period of several months. The 
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testimony is that he suffered great pain several 
months succeeding the injury and still suffers 
some pain and may continue to suffer pain dur-
ing his entire lifetime. Third, future surgical 
operations. The evidence shows that thus far he 
has been unable to use artificial limbs due to the 
condition of the nerves in the stumps of his legs 
and that surgery on the nerves will be neces-
sary to allevia~te this condition; that the stumps 
of his legs must be reshwped in order to be re-
fitted with artificial limbs. There is medical tes-
timony to the effect that because of the length 
of ~the stumps he may never be able to use arti-
ficial limbs. According to medical testimony, at 
least two and perhaps three painful, expensive, 
surgical operations will be required with uncer-
tain results. Fourth, that in all probability he will 
always be in need of the services of an attendant. 
Fifth, loss of earnings from the date of injury to 
the date of trial. Sixth, and it has been held in 
Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 
60 L. Ed. 1117, that adequate allowance should 
be made 'for the earning power of money' which 
refers to the interest rate at which the principal 
sum may be discounted. The interest rate ha;s 
heretofore been discussed. 
''There is no fixed standard by which to 
measure the damages for pain and suffering, 
mental anguish or shock to the nervous system or 
humiliation. Such mat~ters rest in ~the sound judg-
ment of the jury. The Court gave complete and 
pro,per instructions to the jury on all these ele-
ments of damage. It must be presumed that the 
jury followed the instructions of the Court. If 
the jury, in giving the evidence presented on be-
half of the plaintiff a construction most favorable 
to him, which it had a right to do, under the in-
structions of the Court, could have arrived at 
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the verdict in the amount awarded, and if there 
is substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, i~t 
will not be disturbed. Jones v. Atlantic Refining 
Co., supra. 
''"'here the jury in arriving at the amount 
of the verdict could not be said to have disre-
garded the Court's instructions, even though the 
Court might disagree with respect t·o the amount 
awarded, the Court cannot disturb the verdict on 
the ground that it is excessive. Delaney v. New 
York Central, supra. Verdicts in similar eases are 
not controlling in determining whether the ver-
dict under consideration is excessive and, there-
fore, no comparisons will be made. The amount 
of damages awarded is not so excessive as to 
show that the jury was actuated by sympathy, 
emotion, passion or prejudice. The amount award-
ed is sustained by sufficient evidence and is 
not contrary to law." 
G01.trley v. Chicago & E. I. Ry. Co., (Ill. May 3, 1938) 
14 N. E. (2d) 842. The Appellate Court held that the 
jury's verdict of $80,000 for injuries to a 55 year old 
railroad engineer who had both hands crushed necessi-
tating the amputation of his left arm above the wrist 
and part of his right hand, and who ~suffered infection 
and whose injuries were not healed at the trial two and 
a half years after the accident, whose average earnings 
were $3,000 annually and who had a reasonable life ex-
pectancy of 15 years, was excessive by $20,000. 
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Hargrove (Apr. 27, 
1948) 35 So. (2d) 1. A jury awarded $50,000 in dam-
ages to a 43 year old lineman for severe electric burns 
that required removal of the right hand and forearm 
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and several skin grafts on the right leg was held not 
to be excessive where it appeared that the lineman had 
earned $6,500 a year prior to his injuries; that his life 
expectancy was 25 years, that he was no longer able to 
work as a lineman and lacked training for any other em-
ployment. The Oourt, in supporting the verdict, stated: 
'' * * * The elements that enter into a judg-
ment like this are so diverse that it often requires 
more of humility than it does of law properly to 
assess them. The Judge who ·Overlooks the fact 
that the lineman, the yardman, the plumber, and 
the cook are made of the same common cl'ay that 
he is, is not equipped to do so.'' 
Howard v. Baltimore & 0. C. T. R. Co. (Ill. Nov. 6, 
1945) 327 Ill . .&pi?· 83, 63 N. E. (2d) 774. The court 
upheld a verdict of $50,000 for a 51 year old switchman 
who suffered severe scalp wounds leaving a disfiguring 
scar and amputation of one arn1. The Court stated: 
"We have often recognized, in passing upon 
the amount of damages awarded, the decline in 
the purchasing power of money.'' 
* • * * * * * * 
"After careful consideration of the evidence 
bearing upon defendant's contention that 'the 
verdict was f,or an excessive amount' we are satis-
fied that we would not be justified in disturbing 
the amount awar~ed by the jury.'' 
Oban et al v. Stoll (Ill. May 7, 1946) 328 Ill. App. 
398, 66 N. E. (2d) 316. The Court held that a verdict 
of $50,000 to a 48 year old tool maker earning some 
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$3,700 per year who suffered a fracture of the pelvis 
and of the neck and pubic bone on the left side, who 
suffered concussion of the brain, remaining in a state 
of shock for a long time, who was operated on for re-
moval for part of an intestine, and whose left leg be-
came four and one-half inches shorter and two-thirds 
the size of his right limb, was not excessive. 
Greenberg et al 'V. Garfield-Passaic Bus Co. et al., 
(Xew Jersey, July 24, 1946) 48 Atl. (2d) 389. Verdi~ts, 
awarding $50,000 damages for past and future suffering 
of a previously active 55 year old housewife as a re-
sult of injuries necessitated amputation of both legs be-
low the knees, £or $35,000 to her husband for cost of her 
care, loss of services and his out of pocket expenses were 
held to be not excessive. The Court stated : 
''The verdict in favor of Mrs. Greenberg of 
$50,000 as compensation for the pain and suffer-
ing which she has and will suffer as a result of 
the accident seems to us not ·to be exces~sive." 
A vance v. Thompson (Ill.' Oct. 30, 1943) 320 Ill. 
A.pp. 406, 51 N. E. (2d) 334. In a'n action by a 22 year old 
brakeman to recover against the railroad under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act for injuries resulting in 
amputation of his right leg three inches above the knee 
and of his left leg four inches below the knee, an award 
of $125,000 remitted by the trial court to $100,000 was 
held not to be excessive. 
Cooksey v. Atchison, T .. & 8. F. Ry. Co. (Gal. Mar. 
11, 1947) 178 P. (2d) 69, 72. A verdict of $42,000 to a 
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54 year old conductor who was earning $6,000 annually 
and had a life expectancy of 17 years for serious perman-
ent back injuries requiring the wearing of a steel brace 
and which might develo,p into kyphosis, wrist fracture, 
and heel injury which would likely be permanent and 
would cause pain and physical discomfort, was held not 
to be excessive. The Court stated: 
'' * * * At the time of the injury his salary 
was about $6,000 annually, and he had a life ex-
pectancy of approximately 17 years. Damages 
must be determined according to the circum-
stances of each particular case. It is true, as ap-
pellant asserts, that a consideration of the 
amounts awarded as damages in previous cases 
is of value in determining IYhether an award is 
excessive, but it is also true that consideration 
should he given to differences in economic con-
ditions prevailing when the awards were made. 
For a discussion of the rule that notice may be 
taken of the differences in the purchasing power 
of money at different times, and that such notice 
should be taken in making an a ward of damages, 
reference is made to Foster v. Pestana, supra, 77 
Cal. _Aipp. 2d ........ , 177 P. 2d 54, 59." 
Carrano v. Red Star Transit Co., Inc. (Pa. Nov. 18, 
1943) 58 F. Supp. 643, 644. The Court supported aver-
dict of $37,284 to plaintiff for serious and permanent 
injury to his left elbow. The Court stated: 
''The verdict was large, considering the lack 
of right on the part of plaintiff to practice medi-
cine. On the other hand, the plaintiff was seri-
ously injured. His left elbow (he is left-handed) 
was completely de,stroyed, the accident leaving 
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him with a 'flail' joint. The case disclosed a his-
tory of long and excessive pain, which persisted 
after a very expensive 0 1pera tion to remove a 
growth at the end of a severed main nerve of the 
arm. Even some doubt was thrown upon ampu-
tation of the arm as a cure f·or this pain. Under 
these circumstances the verdict, though large, is 
not so grossly excessive as to demand retrial.'' 
The Court may be interested in Federal District 
Judge Louis E. Goodman's Order Denying Motion for 
New Trial in the case of Guthrie, plaintiff, vs. Southern 
Pacific Company, defendant, recently tried in the United 
States District Court for the N·orthern District of Cali-
fornia, Southern Division, No. 28106-G, which is as fol-
lows: 
''ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
''I am of the opinion that I fairly and proper-
ly instructed the jury in this case. 
The jury could well have concluded from the 
evidence that plaintiff's injury was proximately 
caused by negligence of defendant and the crew 
of the locomotive which ran over and cut off 
plaintiff's leg, and, further, that plaintiff was 
himself free of any contributory negligence. 
The verdict of $100,000.00 damages was large. 
But not so large as to shock the court's sense of 
justice. True, it is larger than I might have 
awarded. On that ground, however, I may not set 
it aside. Jones v. Atlantic Refining Co., 55 Fed. 
Supp. 17; Delaney v. New York Central R. R. 
Co., 68 Fed. Supp. 70. 
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Plaintiff was a 58 year old locomotive engi-
neer with a working lifetime of railroad exper-
ience. He had a working expectancy of 12 years 
and a life expectancy of 15 years. His leg, ampu-
tated between knee and thigh, wa,s fully incapaci-
tating. It may be fairly concluded from the evi-
dence that, while there might be a possibility in 
the future of using an artificial limb, physical 
conditions indicate such possibility to be most un-
certain and even remote. Present value of loss of 
future earnings is substantial - between $60,000 
and $70,000. The amount of general damage rest-
ed in the discretion of the jury. In that domain, 
reasonable minds could differ. 
For these reasons, the motion for new trial 
and for a diff~rent judgment is denied. 
Dated: January 5, 1949.'' 
The court will observe that many of the verdicts 
herein set f·orth were rendered and supported ,several 
years ago, at times when the value of the dollar was 
much greater than it is today. As was pointed out in 
the Armentrout case, $160,000 in 1947 represented a 
value of only $100,000 in 1939 according to United States 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and 
the cost of living has increased considerably since the 
Spring of 1947. 
Oounsel for the defendant has characterized as in-
fl.ammatory the ruling of the trial court in allowing the 
plaintiff to exhibit his stump to the jury. Authorities 
are legion to the effect that the trial court has a dis-
cretionary power in a personal injury action to permit 
the exhibition of injured portions of a person's body to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rl 
63 
the jury and unless the exhibition is calculated to preju-
dice the jury it is in all respects proper. It is submitted 
that the very best evidence as to the nature of an injury 
is a view of the injury itself. See 32 C.J.S. Sec. 610 
where it is stated: 
''Where an issue as to personal injuries or 
disability is involved, the injured ~person may be 
permitted to exhibit to the jury the wound 'Or in-
jury, or the member or portion of his body on 
which such wound or injury was inflicted, at least 
if exhibition of the injured member is not calcu-
lated to prejudice the jury. Thus the eourt has 
permitted the exhibition of an ankle, a knee, a 
foot, a leg, an arm, a hand, an eyesocket, and 
various other parts of the body. A similar exhibi-
tion may be made where the injury has resulted 
in the death of the injured person or the loss of 
a member or part of his body." 
Jones on Evidence, Fourth Edition, Sec. 398, states 
the rule: 
''Real or demonstrative evidence is brought 
to the knowledge of the trier of facts by means 
of inspection or without the intervention of the 
testimony of witnesses. A common case is where, 
in an action for injury to the person, the plain-
tiff is permitted to exhibit the affected or in-
jured part to the jury. Although it is objected 
that such evidence cannot be preserved in the 
record for review, and may tend unduly to pre-
judice or inflame the jury, the well-settled !prac-
tice in such a case is to permit the jury to see the 
party's injuries. So doing is said to bring before 
the jury a part of the res gestae, and to enable 
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them to determine the nature and the character 
of the injury in a more satisfactory manner than 
by means of the description of witnesses." 
Roy v. Oregon Short LineR. Co .. , (S. Ct. Idaho, Mar. 
28, 1935) 42 Pac. (2d) 476,478. Action was brought under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover dam-
age-s for loss of plaintiff's left ·arm below the elbow. The 
Court, over objection of defense counsel, allowed the 
plaintiff to show the stump of his arm to the jury. The 
Supreme Court in affirming the lower court's ruling 
in that regard stated: 
"It is contended that the verdict is excessive, 
and that the exhibition of respondent's arm, to-
gether with certain allegedly improper remarks of 
counsel, was such as to strongly and improperly 
excite the sympathies of the jury. The exhibition 
of the ann, though unnecessary, since the nature 
of the injury was admitted, was not so improper 
as to be prejudicial. 22 C. J. 788-789; 'Stephens v. 
Elliott, 36 1font. 92, 92 P. 45; City of Topeka v. 
Bradshaw, 5 Kan. App. 879, 48 P. 751; Bowerman 
v. Columbia Gorge Motor Coach System, 132 Or. 
106, 284 P. 579; Sears v. Goldsmith, 136 Or. 151, 
298 P. 219; Cook v. Danaher Lumber Co., '61 
Wash. 118, 112 P. 245; Cunningham v. Union Pac. 
Ry. Co., 4 Utah 206, 7 Pac. 795; Dunkin v. City 
of Hoquiam, 56 Wash. 47, 105 P. 149; Faras v. 
Lower Californja Deve}opment Go., 27 Cal. App. 
688, 151 P. 35 ; Zelhaver v. Koepke, 260 Mich. 428, 
245 N. W. 490; Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co. of 
Texas v. Foster (Tex. Civ. App.) 38 S. W. (2d) 
391.'' 
See also 20 Am. J ur. Sec. 720. 
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In Cnnningham. c. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 4 Utah 206, 
7 Pac. 795, 798, the Court said: 
"3. The court below permitted the plaintiff 
to exhibit the injured foot to the jury, and this is 
alleged to be an error. While, ·of course, the trial 
court should be careful and not allow improper 
matters to be broug·ht to the attention of the jury, 
the exhibition of the injured foot can hardly be 
called improper: for, as was said in the case of 
:Jiulhado v. Railroad Co., 30 N. Y. 370,-
. Such exhibition certainly tended to make the 
description of the injury more intelligible, and it 
cannot be supposed that it could have had any un-
due influence upon the feelings or sympathies of 
the jury. As well might it be contended that a_ 
man who had lost an arm or a leg by a similar in-
jury should not be permitted to appear before a 
jury and testify in relation to it, lest thereby 
their feelings might be influenced, and, under the 
undue excitement created thereby, they might do 
injustice. We cannot assume that any :Such conse-
quences will follow such a course of examination, 
and we cannot perceive that it was objectionable 
in the present instance.' See Whart. Ev. Sec. 
346.'' 
Defense counsel in his brief states : 
" * * * obviously the only purpose of the ex-
hibition was to inflame the sym~pathy and stir the 
prejudice of the jury.'' 
An interesting case which is no doubt fresh in the 
mind and memory of each member of this Court is State 
v._Moore (Utah) 183 P. 2d 973, where appellant, upon 
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appeal from conviction of rape, claimed that he had 
been prejudiced in his trial because the prosecutrix had 
been permitted t·o continuously exhibit her legs, injuries 
and all to the jury. The Court on page 977 stated: 
''Counsel for appellant earnestly argue that 
the court committed prejudicial error in allow-
ing the prosecutrix to sit in the court room with 
her legs bare, whereby her scars remaining from 
the injuries she sustained on the night of the al-
leged attack were continuously visible t·o the jur-
ors. They also urge that it was prejudicial error 
to allow the district attorney to exhibit to the jur-
ors the scars on her legs as occular evidence, as 
tending to excite pas·sion and prejudice on a mat-
ter not in issue. However, there was a definite 
relationship between the injuries she received on 
the night in question and her lack of consent to 
the act of sexual .intercourse. The scars indicated 
injuries which evidenced a physical condition of 
pain and ;suffering which might have made con-
sent to sexual intercourse highly improbable. 
There is no evidence that prosecutrix exposed any 
part of her limbs which would not ordinarily be 
visible anyway. She was not required to wear 
hose. If she had suffered grave facial injuries in 
falling from defendant's car, it could not be 
urged that she would have had to veil her face 
while in the courtroom. The record does not sug-
gest any indecent exposure nor any impropriety 
on the part of the prosecutrix in the courtroom. 
This assignment of error based on the alleged im-
proper exhibition of the legs of the prosecutrix 
without hose, is overruled.'' 
Defendant evidently loses sight of the fact that 
throughout plaintiff's lifetime the ~stump of his arm will 
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be continuously exhibited to others. His wife, his mother, 
his father, his children, his close friends and n1any others 
will become personally and visually acquainted with the 
remaining portions of this maimed limb. I do not believe 
that they will be shocked by its appearance; neither do 
I believe that the jury was shocked in any way or man-
ner which went beyond the rights of the plaintiff in 
proving his case to the jury. I suppose counsel would 
have been better satisfied if plaintiff had been kept 
behind a screen outside the view of the jury during the 
progress of the trial, or better ·still if he had made no 
appearance whatsoever and his testimony placed before 
the jury by deposition. Of course, his injuries, severe 
as they were, could not do other than stir a certain 
amount of sympathy on the pa~t of any individual, but 
this was and is plaintiff's case, a;s are his injuries and 
resulting handicaps. However, there is nothing in the 
size of the verdict as rendered to indicate that the jury 
violated its sworn duty to render ·a true and just ver-
dict according to the law and the evidence. 
Counsel for defendant, while not including Instruc-
tion No. 11 in his Statement of Errors, saw fit to criti-
cize that instruction on the gr~und that it allowed the 
jury to consider five distinct elements of damage in ar-
riving at a verdict. For convenience of the court In-
struction No. 11 is set forth herein (R. 63) : 
''If YOU find the issues in favor of the plain-
tiff and· against the defendant it will then be-
come your duty to award him such damages as 
you may find from a preponderance ·of the evi-
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dence and under the:se instructions will fairly and 
adequately compensate him for any injury and 
damage he has sustained as a proximate result of 
defendant's negligence complained of by him. 
"In determining the amount of such damage, 
you may consider the nature and extent of his 
injury thus sustained and the amount of suffer-
ing, both mental and physical, that he has en-
dured and that he will probably endure in the fu-
ture and the extent to which he has been vre-
vented and will be prevented from engaging in the 
ordinary and usual affairs of life as theretofore 
enjoyed by him and his loss of bodily function 
and disfigurement. You may likewise consider his 
actual loss of past earnings and any impairment 
of earning capacity in the future. 
''The total of damages thus assessed for all 
of the foregoing must not exceed the sum of $150,-
000.00, the amount prayed for in plaintiff's com-
plaint.'' 
The courts recognize that in cases of permanent 
disfigurement of a person's body an element of damage 
comes into the case which is separate and apart from 
the loss of earnings and the general mental and phy-
sical suffering resulting from injury. The Court's in-
struction advised the jury that they eould take into con-
sideration the loss of bodily function and the extent 
to which plaintiff had been prevented and would be 
prevented from engaging in the ordinary and usual af-
fairs of life, and that they also could take into consider-
ation the disfigurement resulting from the amputation 
of his arm. As a matter of fact the court could have 
advised the jury more fully with respect to the dam-
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ages plaintiff could haYe recovered. The jury could have 
been advised as to the n1ortification and humiliation to 
which plaintiff would be subjected by reason of his dis-
figurement. 
In the case of nluskogee Electric Traction Co. v. 
Wimmer, 80 Okla. 11, 194 Pac. 107, 113, 11-±, the follow-
ing instruction was given by the trial court: 
''If you find for the plaintiff, you will allow 
him as damages such sum as will compensate 
him for the injuries he has sustained, not exceed-
ing $10,000, which is the amount sued for. The 
elements entering into the damages, are as f·ol-
lows: 
"(1) The value of his time during the pe-
riod he was disabled by the injury. 
"(2) If the injuries have impaired Wim-
mer's power to earn money in the future, such 
sum as will compensate him for such loss of 
power. 
'' ( 3) Such reasonable sum as the jury shall 
award him on account of any pain and anguish 
he had suffered by reason of his injuries. 
'' ( 4) Such prospective suffering and 1oss of 
health, if any, as the jury may believe reasonably 
·certain to result therefrom, from all the evidence 
before them in the case, and that he will sustain 
by reason 'Of his injuries. 
'' ( 5) Such sum as the jury deem ~roper for 
the inconvenience of going through life with one 
eye and ~such mortification and anguish as Wim-
mer has suffered and will continue to suffer by 
reas~on of the mutilation of his face, and .the fact 
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that he may become an object of curiosity and 
ridicule among his fellows.'' 
Of this instruction the Court stated: 
''In the case of Ferguson & Wheeler Land, 
Lumber & Handle Go. v. Good, supra, in which 
the jury was allowed to take into consideration 
the disfigurement of the plaintiff, caused by the 
l,oss of his eye, in arriving at the damages, the 
court held: 
"'The humiliation and mental anguish that 
must necessarily be experienced by the personal 
disfigurement resulting from the los's of an eye 
is a proper element for the consideration of the 
jury.' 
"In Coombs v. King, 107 Me. 376, 78 Atl. 468, 
Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1121, the court approved an in-
struction permitting the jury to find for the plain-
tiff for humiliati,on and mortification, by virtue 
of disfigurement, saying: 
'' 'There is good reason for the rule. The dis-
figurement is a physical inj-q.ry. It is a continu-
ing injury. The mental suffering may continue 
with it. The mental ,suffering is a real injury. It 
proceeds necessarily and inevitably from the phy-
sical injury. It is a natural consequence of the 
injury. Compensation, omitting this element, is 
not full compensation. One might be made re-
pulsive to the sight for life with comparatively 
little physical injury, and yet, according ,to the 
rule contended for, be entitled to but little com-
pensation.' 
"In Amanta v. Michigan C. R. Co., 177 :Mich. 
280, 143 N. "\V. 76, where the injury complained 
of was the loss of a leg or arm, the court approved 
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an instruction allowing the jury to consider hu-
Iniliation for such condition, and holding that the 
physical condition of the plaintiff was a com-
plete answer to the contention that there was no 
evidence of humiliation and of future suffering, 
although it appeared that the wound had com-
pletely healed. 
''In Shortridge v. Scarritt Est. Co., 145 Mo. 
App. 295, 130 S. ,V. 126, the injury complained 
of resulted in disfigurement to the face, and the 
court sustained a verdict for mental suffering 
aris_ing from contemplation of the disfigurement, 
sayrng: 
'' 'The distinction sought to be made, in the 
cases to which we have referred, between mental 
pain caused by physical pain and mental pain 
produced by the bitter knowledge that the victim 
would be maimed or disfigured for life, is more 
refined and subtle than it is practical or hu-
mane. How can it be said that one is more remote 
and intangible than the other~ Both are real, sub-
stantial, natural consequences of the injury tha;t 
caused the disfigurement. It is just as certain that 
the injured person will be oppressed by a sense of 
humiliation and mortification over the despoiling 
of his body as it is that he will suffer mental an-
guish as :a result of his physical pain. The jury 
can understand the nature and extent of the one 
as well as the other, and estimate the com~ensa­
tion of each with equal exactness. To deprive 
plaintiff of this element ·of his damages would 
be violative of the fundamental rule that gives 
to the plaintiff, injured by the negligence of the 
defendant, full and fair compensation for the ac-
tual damages suffered.' 
''The Supreme Court of North Carolina in 
Britt v. Car. No. R. Co., 148 N. C. 37, 61 S. E. 
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601, sustained the admission of a statement by the 
pl~aintiff to the effect that it almost broke his 
hea:rt to know that he would be a cripple for life, 
saying: 
'' 'This, however, is a part of the suffering 
like the physical suffering, the decreased earning 
capacity, the cost of nursing and medical atten-
tion, which are a part of the 'present and pros-
'pective loss' resulting from the injury, and the 
immediate and necessary consequences thereof.' 
"In the case of United States Exp. Co. v. 
Wahl, 94 C. C. A. 260, 168 Fed. 848, the court 
held that it was proper to consider the humilia-
tion resulting from the disfigurement from the 
loss of an eye, and considered the law settled in 
this respect, by virtue of the case of McDermott 
v. Severe, 202 U. S. 600, 26 Sup. Ct. 709, 50 L. 
Ed. 1162. 
''The cases quoted above are the recent ex-
pressions upon this question that we have been 
able to obtain. However, such principle has been 
the established rule throughout most of the states 
for a long period of years." 
In the case of Wilson v. Kurn, (Mo.) 183 S. W. 
(2d) 553 (1944), the plaintiff received injuries in a 
crossing accident which resulted in the amputation of 
his arm. A verdict for plaintiff was affirmed. An in-
struction on the measure of damages advised the jury 
that they could consider plaintiff's age and ex'pectancy, 
his diminished earning capacity, and "you will also take 
into consideration any physical disfigurement which 
plaintiff has sustained,'' and any physical pain or men-
tal anguish, loss of wages and medical expenses. The de-
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fendant contended that this "\Yas error because it author-
ized compensation for disfigurement in addition to dam-
ages for mental anguish and diminution of earnings and 
thereby authorized ''double damages.'' The Court held 
that the instruction was proper and in doing so, ·stated: 
''Furthermore, as the appellant says, disfig-
urement in ·and of itself is not necessarily an 
element of damage except for its effect upon the 
mind and is therefore compensable as mental 
anguish. Shortridge v. Scarrit Estate Co., 145 
~Io. App. 295, 130 'S. W. 126. For this reason 
damages for mental anguish may, be recovered 
under a plea of physical disfigurement. Pand-
jiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98 S. W. 
(2d) 969. And by the same reasoning the anguish 
of physical disfigurement should be compensable 
under a plea of mental anguish alone. 
''The mental angui·sh of physical disfigure-
ment differs in degree ·and i:s not identical vvith 
the mental pain accompanying serious personal 
injury in general and so considered the two are 
not 'double damages' in the sense Df an allowance 
of double compensation for the smne loss. 49 Har. 
L. R. 1033. But even so we cannot see that the 
instruction differs in principle from Baker v. 
Chicago B. & Q. R. Co., 327 M·o. 986, 39 S. W. 2d 
535, 545, which ·permitted the jury to consider 
'pain of body and anguish of mind,' loss of earn-
ings and 'any crippling, apart from pain of body 
and anguish of mind and apart from loss of earn-
ings * * * which the evidence ~shows he has sus-
tained or will be reasonably certain to sustain in 
the future.' See, also, Banks v. Morris & Co., 302 
Mo. 254, 257 S. W. 482. '' 
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In Baker v. Chicago B .. & Q. R. Co., (Mo.) 39 S. W. 
(2d) 535, a contention was made similar to that made in 
the case at bar by the defendant. The Baker case was 
also a Federal Employers' Liability Act case. Plaintiff 
brought suit for personal injuries. The injuries resulted 
in a gradual decalcification of the bones of the right foot 
and his inability to use the foot resulted in atrophy of 
the muscles. The testimony indicated that this condi-
tion would become progressively worse. At page 545 of 
39 S. W. (2d) is set out at length the instruction given 
to the jury relating to the measure of damages. In that 
instruction the jury was told they could consider any 
pain of body and anguish of mind which the evidence 
showed the plaintiff had suffered or would suffer in the 
future, any loss of ear~ings which he had sustained or 
was reasonably certain to sustain in the future and ''for 
any crippling, apart fr?m pain ·of body and anguish of 
mind, and apart from loss of earnings, which the evi-
dence shows he has sustained or will be reasonably cer-
tain to sustain in the future.'' The jury was further 
instructed that they could take into consideration the 
character and nature of plaintiff's injury, whether per-
manent or not, and to assess his damages at such sum 
as would be fair and re!asonable compensation for his 
injuries. 
Defendant criticized this instruction up o ~ the 
grounds that it permitted the recovery of double dam-
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ages. Defendant contended that "crippling" is not a 
separate and independent element of damages which are 
properly recoverable by plaintiff and that is included 
within the elements of bodily 1lain, mental anguish and 
loss of earnings, which elements were also set out in the 
instruction. 
The court held that this instruction properly set 
forth the elements of damages. and that there was no 
duplication of recovery permitted by said instruction. 
In Purdy v. Swift & Co., 34 Cal. App. (2d) 656, 94 
Pac. (2d) 389 (1939), the Court, in considering a con-
tention that the verdict was excessive, stated: 
" ' * * * in addition to the loss of earning 
capacity the jury were 'entitled to consider the 
inconvenience and annoyance of the permanent 
loss of the sense of smell,1 impairment of the sense 
of taste, loss of memory ~nd mental alertness and 
the other mental and personality changes above 
enumerated, together with the pain and suffering 
immediately following the injury, much of which 
persisted to the time of trial.'' 
In Prettyman v. Topkis, 3 Atl. (2d) 708 (1938), the 
Court stated as follows: 
"In addition to pain and suffering, both past 
and future, the jury could properly take into con-
sider!ation in arriving at its verdict the loss to 
the plaintiff occasioned by his permanent injuries, 
not only the impairment of earning ability, but 
also the inconvenience which would follow in his 
other relations of life.'' 
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In Conroy v. Reid, 132 Me. 162, 168 Atl. 215, the 
Court stated: 
"* * * She (plaintiff) is entitled to recover 
for the pain and suffering which resulted from 
her injuries. The scar upon her head is a physi-
cal disfigurement which along with the mental 
chagrin, mortification - - discomfort she endures 
now and in the future as a direct and natural 
consequence of it, is an element of damage for 
which she is entitled to recover." 
Counsel, in his oral argument, made reference to 
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 Pac. (2d) 649, 
and claimed that this case was authority for the Court 
t'O hold ~the present instruction erroneous. Of course, in 
the first place the verdict in the Bruner case was upheld 
and the court held that the instruction there involved was 
not prejudicial error. In that case the instruction set 
forth that the jury could take into consideration in 
assessing damages the loss of wages and future earnings, 
also the impairment of earning capacity, and also the 
loss of power and capacity to work and its effect upon 
his future. However, the court said that this did not 
constitute prejudicial error. In the case at bar we ~submit 
that the instruction is not subject to the same criticism 
as the instruction in the Bruner case; but, even so, it 
does not permit the extent of recovery which was there 
allowed. It is common sense that if a person loses his 
arm, he has lost something besides the mere capacity 
to work. The body is disfigured. He will suffer morti-
fication and humiliation from his disfigurement. There 
is an actual loss of bodily function which will prevent 
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him from doing the ordinary things thai he otherwise 
could do. For instance, tying a tie, or his shoe laces. 
His capacity to drive an automobile will be interfered 
with. Those matters certainly under the authorities are 
elements for which defendant by reason of its negligence 
must compensate. 
1\T e submit that the instruction given properly pre-
sented this element of damage to the jury as indicated 
not only by common sense but by the authorities hereto-
fore cited. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the damages 
awarded were not only well within the 1>roof on this ele-
ment, but as matter of fact were moderate indeed, and 
that a verdict for the loss of his right arm in the amount 
of $70,000, including all other matters of damage, can-
not be interfered with under the principles of law here-
tofore announced by this Court and supported by the 
wealth of authority herein cited. 
POINT III. 
EXHIBITS "G" AND "H" WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED 
IN EVIDENCE AND THE FOUNDATIONAL BASIS. FOR 
SAID EXHIBITS WAS AMPLE AND SUFFICIENT UNDER 
THE AUTHORITIES 
The real purpose of defendant's attack upon Ex-
hibits "G" and "H" is disclosed in its brief commenC-
ing at page 21. It apparently desires this Court to 
overrule the following cases recently decided: Bruner 
v. McOarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 Pac. (2d) 649·; Allison 
v. McCarthy, et ~al, 106 Utah 278, 147 Pac. (2d) 870; 
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Pauly v. McCarthy, et ~al., 106 Utah 431, 184 Pac. (2d) 
123; SchlaUer v. Mc0a~t1lvy, 196 Pac. (2d) 968. 
This contention of defendant is contrary to the law 
as set forth by the Tenth Circuit Court in Southern Pa-
cific Corrt1pi(J;wy v. J(l!inge, 65 Fed. (2d) 85 (1933). That 
court in approvi:ng the use of tables similar to these 
exhibits stated: 
''The trial court, concisely but clearly, told 
the jury to ascertain the impairment of Plaintiff's 
earning power resulting from his injury; deter-
mine his expectancy; and arrive at a verdict which 
would reflect the present worth of that impair-
ment. With annuity tables in evidence, the court's 
charge, rendered the jury's task a comparatively 
simple one.'' 
Defendant states that these Exhibits ''should be 
barred in the courts of this jurisdiction, on the general 
ground of their immateriality and incompetency.'' 
These tables are merely mathen1atical computa-
tions made under the direction of a Certified Public 
Accountant disclosing the present lump sum value of 
various monthly payments over a period of the life 
expectancy of a person the same age as the plaintiff irt 
this case. 
We are at a loss to know where a jury of lay per-
sons could ever obtain the facts regarding life expect-
ancy of an individual if this information were not fur-
nished and produced by some qualified person. This 
information, of necessity, comes from mortality tables. 
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Two tables were used in the case at bar, one known 
as the ... -\.merican Experience Table of Mortality which 
has been in general use by insurance companies since 
its publication in 1868. The other was a more recent 
table compiled by the Census Bureau of the U. S. 
Department of Commerce and published in 1941. 
From the life expectancy of the individual further 
computations are made in these exhibits to determine 
the present value of various sums representing monthly 
income. Under the law, the jury is required to dis-
count any sums awarded for loss of future earnings. 
The law is accurately stated by the Court in its Instruc-
tion No. 12 (R. 64). By that instruction the jury was 
advised that plaintiff would not be entitled to recover 
in a lump sum the total accumulations of such loss of 
earnings over the entire period of his disability; that 
the award for such element of damages must be re-
duced or discounted on the basis of a fair rate of inter-
est or return on such sum. 
Expert testimony was introduced by the witness 
:Myrick concerning the rate of interest or return which 
could be fairly expected from a safe investment which 
a person of ordinary prudence, but without any par-
ticular financial experience or skill, could make. It 
would be idle to assume that eight lay jurors could 
accurately discount the award allowed for loss of fu-
ture earnings. The tables introduced as Exhibits "G" 
and '' H'' formed a necessary part of the case to be 
submitted to the jury. We know of no way that a jury 
could be advised of the only accurate method of per-
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forming these calculations except through the testimony 
of an expert who appears in court and under oath states 
that the calculations he has made of the discounts as a 
qualified expert are mathematically accurate. May we 
remind the Court that a high verdict is not necessarily 
an unjust verdict. Experience teaches that pathetically 
low verdicts are many times unjust. No defendant can 
rightfully complain of a verdict based on an accurate 
mathematically accurate formula. 
We submit that the jury should not be left to 
figure these matters by themselves without the assist-
ance of available expert assistance. The introduction 
of these exhibits is necessary. If the witness merely 
testified to all of these figures and they were not pre-
served in written form, it would be impossible for the 
jury to remember the calculations and figures or to 
make any sensible use of them in their deliberations. 
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Ex-
hibits are admissible, and we refer the Court ~gain 
to the language used in the Utah cases herein cited 
where the purposes and materiality of the exhibits are 
discussed. 
The balance of defendant's argument regarding 
the exhibits has no merit and is apparently made in 
the hope that it will bolster the real purpose of the 
defendant. It is to be noted defendant does not now 
and has never questioned the accuracy of the mortality 
tables nor the accuracy of the computations made under 
the direction of Mr. Wood. 
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During the course of the trial and at the tin1e 
the exhibits were offered in evidence, the Judge stated 
to defendant's counsel: 
'·'yell, if you doubt the accuracy of the 
books or the data, perhaps you could-you would 
have an opportunity to present any evidence you 
care to with respect to it" (R. 267, 268). 
X o effort was made by the defendant at any time 
during the trial to show any inaccuracy in the com-
putations contained in the exhibits. This case comes 
to this Court with the mathematical accuracy of the 
exhibits unchallenged. An expert accountant, under 
oath, testified that the exhibits were mathematically ac-
curate. That testimony has never been challenged or 
contradicted on the record or otherwise. 
The motion for new trial was filed :May 29th, 1948, 
argued June 26th and July 3rd, and finally denied Sep-
tember 27th, 1948. Defendant did not then and it has 
not yet challenged the accuracy of the computations or 
formulas used. Defendant's counsel merely sits back 
and says: 
"I can't be sure the computations are ac-
curate. The expert on figures has used the stand-
ard books in his profession, but as a lawyer, I 
don't know about those books. I want something 
more.'' 
vVhat more was there to introduce in evidence 
as foundation for the admission of the exhibits~ The 
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formulas were taken from standard books generally 
used in the accounting profession to eliminate the ne-
cessity of long drawn out calculations. Mr. Wood ex-
plained it would take perhaps a month to accomplish 
the necessary calculations shown by the exhibits. If 
the calculations could be made with two or three strokes 
of the pen there would be no necessity for books show-
ing the result of such computations. The tables are 
merely 1nathematical calculations made to aid the jury 
in arriving at a determination of the amount of money 
which should he allowed for loss of future earnings. 
Appellant's very argument supports plaintiff's con-
tention that these mathematical facts and computa-
tions, which must be used by the jury in determining 
present value of a discounted future diminution of 
earning capacity, can only be made available to a jury 
by mathematically correct tables prepared by qualified 
experts. As testified by ~1:r. Wood, the first item related 
to the sum of $1.00, and in order for an individual to re-
ceive 457 monthly payments of $1.00 each, where the 
interest rate or return was 2.%% per annum, it would 
be necessary to deposit now $283.07. We submit that no 
jury of laymen could make that calculation without ex-
pert assistance. The Court could no doubt if it so de-
sired, sit down and determine the mathematical ac-
curacy of that computation. Mr. Wood thought it would 
take about 30 days to make all necessary calculations. 
Counsel for plaintiff has not undertaken to test 
the figures in this manner principally because counsel 
for plaintiff produced an expert accountant who testi-
fied, under oath, that this would be the result reached. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
83 
Until it appears that this is not so, it would seem that 
to go through the long computations indicated, the trial 
court and this court are justified in accepting the word 
of Mr. 'Yood. Plaintiff's witness testified under oath 
concerning the accuracy of his calculations, identified 
the source of his information, defendant desires the 
court to do what it has never done, refuse the exhibit 
on a theory of imagined inaccuracy. 
Ray G. "Tood, a Certified Public Accountant, was 
a competent witness regarding all matters pertaining 
to figures and mathematical calculations. He is a part-
ner in a firm of Certified Public Accountants duly li-
censed in the State of Utah and having practiced his 
profession for a period of 25 years. He was called to 
testify regarding the mathematical computations ap-
pearing in Exhibits "G" and "H". These computa-
tions were made under his direction and checked by 
him. :i\fr. Wood has used mathematical formulas in 
making calculations similar to those contained in the 
Exhibits for many years. He has prepared Exhibits 
similar to the Exhibits in this case many times before 
and has testified on similar matters as an expert in 
many other cases (R. 275). His statement that the 
publications used by him and exhibited to the Court 
I 
and jury, were also used by Banks was never challenged. 
Exhibits "G" and "H" are mathematically ac-
curate. 
The life expectancy of 38.12 years in Exhibit "G" 
based on the American Experience Table of Mortality 
and the life expectancy of 42.38 years in Exhibit '' H'' 
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based on the United States Life Tables are computa-
tions which can be readily checked at any time by court 
and counsel. He testified, under oath, that the computa-
tions on both Exhibits were mathematically correct (R. 
238, 244), and that the computations on the Exhibits 
were made by use of certain formulas appearing in a 
standard text ( R .. 249). He had personally checked and 
worked the formulas in the text and determined them 
to be accurate (R .. 250). The text containing the formu-
las was a book entitled "Financial Compound Interest 
and Annuity Tables", published by the Financial Pub-
lishing Company. It was used by at least one trust 
company in Salt Lake City. Mr. Wood had checked 
the tables in the book with tables in other books used 
by his profession and in particular a book entitled 
"Mathematics of Finance" by McKenzie, published by 
McGraw Hill Book Company. The mathematical formu-
las in the two books were identical (R. 257). He also 
checked the formulas against those contained in the 
Accountants' Handbook, a publication used by the 
American Institute of Accountants and used generally 
in the accounting profession, and the formulas were 
found to be identical (R. 260). He testified that he 
could figure out the tables in their entirety without 
the use of the formula but that it would take him a long 
time to do so ( R. 2'66). 
The court offered to allow counsel for the defend-
ant the privilege and opportunity to check and test 
the accuracy of the formula used by Mr. Wood and to 
offer any evidence in that regard which he wished be-
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fore the Exhibits were admitted in evidence (R. 269). 
Of course, the court's offer was never accepted and de-
fendant neYer made any offer of proof whatsoever 
controyerting or questioning the accuracy of the figures 
appearing on the Exhibits and defendant does not now 
contend that these mathematical con1putations are er-
roneous. Counsel now advances the proposition that 
the formulas used in the computations were taken from 
books that were not standard; were not properly au-
thenticated, and that no proper foundation was laid for 
the use of the formulas. These contentions are unsup-
ported by the record. Counsel entirely overlooks the 
testimony of ~Ir. Wood that he had personally checked 
the formulas by working some of them and had also com-
pared them with those set forth in other publications and 
had found them to be accurate. He stated that he had 
personally checked the figures in the Exhibits and de-
termined them to be accurate. Counsel for the defend-
ant has had adequate and sufficient time in which to 
satisfy himself regarding the accuracy of the figures. 
The motion for a new trial was held under advise-
ment for six months. Additional time has elapsed since 
appeal was taken from the order of the court denying 
defendant's motion. At no time has counsel contested 
the mathematical accuracy of the Exhibits and they 
must, therefore, be assumed to be accurate. The court 
or the jury having been given the facts upon which the 
calculations were based, if given sufficient time 
and if sufficiently versed in mathematics, could no 
doubt have made the calculations. Mr. Wood made the 
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calculations as an expert in the interest of conserving 
thne on the part of the court and jury. 
Counsel for defendant has failed to advance any 
reason why either the American Experience Tables or 
the United States Life Tables, used in determining life 
expectancy, are not matters of which the court could 
take judicial notice, or that Mr. Wood was not a per-
fectly competent expert in the use of figures or calcula-
tions, or that the calculations themselves were not math-
ematically accurate. Under the authorities cited herein 
the Exhibits were properly received in evidence. 
The defendant has questioned the use of the mor-
tality tables. He has stated that the tables themselves 
should have been introduced in evidence. We are unable 
to understand this language. Does counsel mean that 
plaintiff should have offered Volume VI of the Utah 
Code in evidence before Mr. Wood could testify regard-
ing the American Experience Tables of Mortality~ Ex-
amination of Volume VI of the Utah Code discloses that 
under the American Experience Tables the life ex-
pectancy of a person 26 years of age is 38.12 years. Re-
markably, Mr. Wood testified that the American Ex-
perience Table indicated that a man, 26 years of age, 
would have a life expectancy of 38.12 years, or 457 
months. There being 12 months in a year, 12 x 38.12 
gives the result of 457.44 months. What other or differ-
ent testimony would there have been before the jury 
had the Statutes been given to them~ 
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It has been held in many cases that the Court can 
take judicial notice of the American Experience Tables 
of Mortality which were compiled in the year 1860. 
Southern Pac. Co. r. De r alle Da Costa (Oct. 4, 1911), 
190 F. 689, 698; Heath v. Stephens et ux (Wash. July 
28, 1927), 258 Pac. 321, 322; Roalsen v. Oregon Steve-
doring Co., C\Yash. )lay 14, 1928), 267 Pac. 433, 435; 
Whetstine r. Atchis~on, T. & 8. F. Ry. Co., (Kan. Jan. 
30, 1932), 7 Pac. (2d) 501, 505; JI cf..Tair v. Berger, (}font. 
Oct. 26, 1932) 15 Pac. (2d) 834, 838; Ewens v. New1nan 
et al (Cal. ~Iay -!, 1933) 21 Pac. (2d) 1007; Cox v. Pol-
son Logging Co., (\Vash. ~Iay 17, 1943) 138 Pac. (2d) 
169, 176. 
In Southern Pac. Co. v. De Valle Da Costa, supra, 
the Court stated: 
''It is urged also that the court erred in per-
mitting the use of mortality tables without re-
quiring any evidence that the tables were authen-
tic or in general use; but this is a matter of judi-
cial notice, and there is no error in this respect. 
Chamberlayne's Modern Law of Evidence, S.oo. 
859 C." 
In Heath v. Stephens et ux, supra, the court stated: 
'' * * * According to the weight of authority 
the courts will take judicial notice of the stand-
ard tables of mortality. Jones on Evidence, Sec. 
129; 19 R.C.L. 221. And therefore appellants 
might have had the jury instructed definitely as to 
. the life expectancy of the deceased, had a re-
quest therefor been made. Failing such an instruc-
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tion, we cannot say that men and women of whom 
our juries are composed have not had the aver-
age and ordinary experiences of life and are not 
in a position to know that a man of 62, hale, 
strong, and hearty, has the expectancy of a num-
ber of years of usefulness before him, but that 
in the course of nature and human affairs his 
earning power, if dependent upon physical 
strength and dexterity, is likely from that age 
on to decrease steadily and to end in a compara-
tively few years. In any event, mortality tables 
are based on averages, and had the jury been in-
structed as to what such tables proved, they still 
might have found that this man was above the 
average in strength and vitality.'' 
In Roalsen v. Oregon Stevedoring Co., supra, the 
court stated : 
''The court instructed the jury as to Andre-
sen's expectancy of life without the introduction 
in evidence of a mortality table, and error is 
urged because it did so. It may be doubted, ·we 
think, whether this question is open to the appel-
lant, but, conceding it to be so open, we find no 
error in the court's action. The court takes judi-
cial notice of the standard mortality tables ( Suell 
v. Jones, 49 Wash. 582, 96 P. 4), and the court 
can properly inform the jury as to the expectancy 
of life of a given person, where the matter is 
pertinent to the inquiry before it, without taking 
evidence on the matter. The case cited also 
answers another objection the appellant makes in 
this connection, namely, that it was not shown 
that Andresen came within the class of risks to 
which such tables are applicable. But as we said 
in the cited case, whenever it becomes necessary 
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to estin1ate the value of annuities, dower, curtesy, 
or damages for wrongful act, such tables may 
properly be considered. It is true that the effect 
of such tables as evidence is for the trier of the 
facts, and true also that such triers, in determin-
ing the life expectancy of any person, may take 
into consideration his vocation, occupation, and 
condition of health, both mentally and bodily, and 
may find that these considerations destroy the 
value of the tables as evidence, but these consider-
ations only go to the weight of the tables as evi-
dence; they are not inadmissible for such reason.'' 
In Cox v. Polson Logging Co., supra, the Court 
stated: 
"It is the law in this state that the court 
takes judicial notice of standard mortality tables 
and, where the matter is pertinent to the inquiry 
before it, may properly inform the jury as to the 
expectancy of life of the person concerned, with-
out taking evidence on the subject. Roalsen v. 
Oregon Stevedoring Co., 147 Wash. 672, 267 P. 
433. '' 
The trial court, when the witness Wood informed 
him of the contents of the two life tables, was satisfied to 
accept his word upon the authenticity of these tables and 
the information given. There is no proof nor evidence 
that the information given was erroneous or that the 
tables were not authentic. The trial court being satis-
fied, no error was committed. 
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In the case of J( east v. Santa Ysabel Gold J.lfin. Co., 
136 Cal. 256, 68 Pac. 771, the, court stated: 
''There was no error of the court in admit-
ting in evidence McCarty's Statistician & Econo-
mist, containing FaiT's table of expectancy of 
life, to show the probable duration of the life of 
the deceased. It is not questioned that proper 
evidence of such expectancy of life was admis-
sible. In some courts it is said that such tables 
are admissible after proper preliminary proof of 
their authenticity and standard quality. Such 
proof in this case was not made, but the general 
weight of authority is to the contrary, and per-
mits the introduction of such tables as are satis-
factory to the court. The court may or may not 
require such preliminary proof, depending upon 
whether of its own knowledge it is satisfied, or 
whether it desires evidence to satisfy itself of 
the authenticity of the tables. Thus in Gallagher 
v. Market Street Co., 67 Cal. 13, 6 Pac. 869, 51 
Am. Rep. 680, note, it is said: 'Thus, mortuary 
(sic.) tables for estimating the probable duration 
of life of a party at a given age * * * are admis-
sible to prove f~cts of general notoriety and in-
terest in connection with such subjects as may be 
involved in the trial of the cause.' 
The defendant also objects to the use of the U. S. 
Life Tables published by the Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of Census, Washington, D. C .. , on January 11, 
1945, which is found in Volume 19, No. 4, Page 31, Vital 
Statistics, Special Reports. This table also appears in 
the World Almanac for 1945 at page 502. This identi-
cal table was used in determining the life expectancy of 
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plaintiff in the case of Foerster u. Direito, (Cal. July 12, 
1946) 170 Pac. (2d) 986. The court therein stated, p. 992: 
":it: * :it: It was stipulated that plaintiff was 
58 years of age at the time of the accident, and 
that the American Table of Mortality allotted 
to her a life expectancy of 15.39 years. Without 
actual proof thereof courts take judicial notice 
of Mortality Tables. Wong Kit v. Crescent 
Creamery Co., supra, 87 Cal. App. at page 581, 
262 P. 481; Peluso v. City Taxi Co., Supra, 41 
Cal. App. at page 302, 182 P. 808; 31 C.J.S., 
Evidence, Sec. 99, p. 698. The World Almanac 
for 1945, page 502, shows that the life expect-
ancy of a white female, who is 58 years of age, is 
18.46 years according to the United States Bureau 
of the Census. It is common knowledge that the 
life expectancy of human beings has rapidly in-
creased in recent years on account of modern 
methods of living, the advanced knowledge of 
medicine and surgery, and of sanitary conditions. 
The purchasing value o{ money has also greatly 
decreased.' ' 3 . 
Here, again, there would be no necessity for the 
introduction in evidence of the~ table itself as only one 
computation therein was of any importance, the life 
expectancy of a white male, age 26 years, whose indi-
cated expectancy is 42.38 years, or 508.56 months. To 
introduce the entire table would not have been helpful. 
Mr. Wood had obtained his copy of the table some few 
years before the trial of the case, and these tables can 
be obtained from the Department of Commerce by any-
one desirous of procuring them. 
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Counsel for defendant during the trial of the case 
was not interested in seeing Mr. Wood's copy of the 
table. He now says the table itself should have been in-
troduced in evidence. 
We submit there is no merit to his contention and we 
are satisfied that Mr. Wood truthfully testified to the 
life expectancy set forth in this table which has been 
recognized in at least one case from the State of Cali-
fornia. See Foerslier v. Direito, supra. We cite the Court 
to City of Twin Falls ex .rel Cannon v. K<oehler et al 
(Idaho) 123 Pac. (2d) 714, and Jones v. Freeman Speak-
·er of the House of Repr.e:sent.atives et al, (Okla.) 146 Pac. 
(2d) 564, where judicial notice was taken of facts and 
circumstances concerning the Federal Census. 
It appears from the authorities cited and text state-
ments mentioned therein that courts have traditionally 
taken judicial notice of mortality tables, census reports 
and information contained in standard publications. Es-
pecially is that true in the field of undertermined fact. 
Life expectancy presents a problem which has never 
been mathematically determined. Neither the Court, the 
jury nor any individual can forecast the days of future 
life of any person; yet the jury is required to ''forecast 
the days'' whenever it is called upon to determine future 
earnings or future diminution of earning capacity. As 
indicated in Volume VI of our Code, there exists many 
. different mortality tables, all based on different exper-
iences and different studies. The jury may or may not 
consider these tables as the trial court instructed the 
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jury in the case at bar. "\Yhether the jury paid any at-
tention ·whatsoever to exhibits ·' G'' and '' H'' does not 
appear from its verdict, and there is nothing in the ver-
dict to either indicate that they did or did not study the 
tables or give them any weight whatsoever in arriving 
at their verdict in this case. But, be that as it may, the 
jury was supplied with proper information on this sub-
ject. If no tables whatsoever had been called to their 
attention, the Court in determining whether or not the 
verdict was adequate or excessive could take judicial no-
tice of these tables for the very purpose of resolving 
that question. 
Defendant rn its attack upon these exhibits com-
plains that there was no instruction given to the jury 
limiting or qualifying the use to be made of the informa-
tion contained in the U. S. Life Table. It is to be ob-
served that defendant made no request limiting or quali-
fying the use to be made of these tables. Before defen-
dant can successfully claim error for such failure re-
quest must be made for such instructions. McAfee v. 
Ogden R. & D. Co., 62 Utah 115, 218 P. 98 (1923); T.ay-
lor v. Los Angeles & 8. L. R. Co., 61 Utah 524, 216 P. 
239 (1923) ; Ward v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co., 9'6 Utah 
·564, 85 P.(2d) 837 (1939). 
In the McAfee case the Court stated: 
"It is a well settled rule in this jurisdiction 
that partial non instruction or omission to charge 
as to a particular issue does not constitute re-
versible error in the absence of a specific request 
for a more specific comprehensive instruction. 
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Such also is the rule in the federal courts. Backus 
v. Fort, St. U. D. Co., 169 U. S. 557, 18 Sup. Ct. 
445, 42 L. Ed. 853 and cases cited." 
The U. S. Supreme Court has also recognized the 
foregoing rule in cases under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act. Lovuisville & N~ashville R. Oo. v. H ollowwy, 
246 U. S. 525, 62 L. Ed. 867, 38 Sup. Ct. 379 (1917); 
Western & AtZantic R. Oo. v. Hughes, 278 U. S. 496, 73 
L. Ed. 473 (1928). 
There are numerous cases holding that if a defen-
dant desires an instruction limiting the force and effect 
to be given mortality or annuity tables, or an instruction 
as to the manner in which such tables are to be applied, 
then he should request such an instruction and upon his 
failure to so request, then he is in no position to complain 
and no error has been committed. Murray v. Omaha 
Transfer Co., 95 Neb. 175, 145 N. W. 360 (1914); St'earns 
Coal ~and Lumber Co. v. Calhoun, 166 Ky. 607, 179 S. 
W. 590 (1915); Peterrs v. Kans:as City Ry. Co., 204 Mo. 
App. 197, 224 8. W. 25 (1920); City :of Key West v. 
Baldwin, 69 Fla. 136, 67 So. 808 (1915) ; Cubbage v. Es-
tate of Youngerman, 15·5 Iowa 39, 134 N. W. 1074; Chi-
cago, R. I. & P. R. Co; v. Johnson, 71 Okl. 118, 175 P. 
494 (1918); Mut1p1hy v. National Ice Cream Co., 114 Cal. 
App. 482,300 Pac. 91 (1931); Rooney v. New York, N.H. 
& H. R. Co., 173 Mass. 222, 53 N. E. 435 (1899); Friend v. 
Ingersoll, 39 Neb. 717, 58 N·. W. 281 (1894). 
Defendant did not except to Instruction No. 13 (R. 
65) wherein the court explained the American Experi-
ence Tables. We submit that upon the record made de-
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fendant can not complain that further instructions were 
not given on this subject. The trial court should have 
been advised by defendant if it was not satisfied with 
the manner in which these exhibits were submitted to 
the jury. 
The only authority which defendant cites criticiz-
ing the use of such Exhibits as "G" and "H", is the 
case of JI cCaffrey v. Szcartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810. 
This case is one from the State of Pennsylvania which 
jurisdiction stands alone in its critical attitude toward 
exhibits such as these. A reading of the case cited reveals 
that the Penns:-lvania Court conceded that it stands 
alone in this respect. 
We submit that defendant's whole contention on 
this subject is without merit or substance and that it does 
not deserve the passing tribute of judicial notice. 
A8SIGN~1ENT OF ERRORS ON PLAINTIFF'S 
CROSS-APPEAL 
I. 
The Trial court committed reversible error in its 
Instruction No. 8, which was as follows (R. 60) : 
''If you believe from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff lost his balance and 
fell from the moving car solely as a result of his 
own failure to exercise reasonable care to main-
tain his footing and balance on the car, then your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, 'no 
cause of action.' " 
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to which plaintiff made the following exception (R ..... ) : 
''Plaintiff excepts to Instruction No. 8 and 
each and every portion thereof on the ground 
and for the reason that there is no evidence what-
soever of plaintiff's contributory negligence." 
II. 
The court committed reversible error in its Instruc-
tion No.9, which was as follows (R. 61): 
"The plaintiff was under a duty at all times 
to exercise such reasonable care for his own safety 
in maintaining his balance and footing on the 
moving car and in performing his duties as a 
brakeman, as would and should have been exer-
cised by an ordinary prudent person of similar 
age, intelligence, and experience under the same 
circumstances. And, if, at the time and place in 
question, he failed to thus exercise that degree of 
care that an ordinary reasonable, prudent person 
would have done under the same circumstances, 
that would he negligence on his part; and, if you 
find from a preponderance of the evidence that 
the plaintiff was negligent as above set forth, 
which proximately caused or contributed to cause 
his injury, then you 'should take that into 
account in connection with any verdict rendered 
in this ease, as set forth in Instruction No. 10. '' 
to which plaintiff made the following exception (R ..... ): 
''Instruction No. 9 and each and every sen-
tence and part thereof upon the ground and for 
the reason, there was no evidence introduced 
which proved or tended to prove that plaintiff 
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was negligent in any way, or that he failed to 
exercise reasonable and proper care for his own 
safety." 
III. 
The court committed reversible error in its Instruc-
tion No. 10, which was as follows (R. 62): 
''If ~-ou find by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant is liable to plaintiff in 
this case, it will be your duty to determine 
whether or not you believe from a preponderance 
of the evidence that plaintiff was also guilty of 
negligence ·which proximately contributed to the 
happening of the injury. If you find that he was 
thus negligent, I say to you as a matter of law 
that you must determine the proportion in which 
the negligence of the defendant and of plaintiff, 
respectively, contributed to the happening of the 
injury, and diminish the amount of his damage in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attribut-
able to the plaintiff. 
"In order to make clear to you what is meant 
by this comparison of negligence which under 
the Federal law, the jury may make, I shall give 
you the following illustrations: 
"If the plaintiff's negligence contributed to 
or caused, we will say, the injury to the extent of 
one-third of the entire negligence, then the plain-
tiff's damages would be reduced by one-third; if 
to the extent of one-half, then his damages would 
be reduced by one-half; if to the extent of two-
thirds, then his damages would be reduced by two-
thirds; and if the plaintiff's negligence was alone 
the cause of the injury, then of course that would 
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wipe out the damages, and your verdict would be 
in favor of the defendant." 
to which plaintiff made the following exception (R. ____ ): 
"Plaintiff excepts to Instruction No. 10 and 
each and every portion thereof, upon the ground 
and for the reason (a) there was no evidence of 
plaintiff's contributory negligence; (b) the in-
struction is confusing and contains an invitation 
to the jury to diminish damages without proof 
of contributory negligence." 
IV. 
The jury erred in reducing the verdict from $70,-
000.00 to $50,000.00 on account of contributory negli-
gence, as hereinabove set forth. 
CROSS-APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE WAS NO PROOF OF CONTRIBUTORY 
NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF 
IN THIS CASE. 
In its answer defendant alleged contributory negli-
gence in general terms (R. 14): 
''Further answering said complaint, defen-
dant alleges that if the plaintiff sustained an acci-
dent and injury as alleged, his own failure to 
exercise reasonable care to avoid such accident 
and injury contributed thereto and was a proxi-
mate cause thereof.'' 
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At no time in the course of the trial did defendant 
prove, or attempt to prove, that the plaintiff was negli-
gent in the performance of his duties. 
The court, in Instruction No. 8, gave in substance 
defendant's requested Instruction No. 8 in the following 
words. (R. 60) : 
'• If you believe from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff lost his balance and 
fell from the moving car solely as a result of his 
own failure to exercise reasonable care to main-
tain his footing and balance on the car, then your 
verdict must be in favor of the defendant, 'no 
cause of action'.'' 
to which plaintiff duly excepted. 
Defendant did not prove, or offer to prove, that 
plaintiff lost his balance and fell from the moving car 
as a result of his failure to maintain his footing and 
balance on the car. The only evidence on the subject was 
plaintiff's own testimony. He never at any time departed 
from his statement that the sole and only reason for 
his fall and injury was the sudden, unexpected and un-
usual jerk of the train. The jury necessarily found that 
there was a sudden, unusual and unexpected jerk which 
dislodged and threw plaintiff from his position on top 
of the car. The jury's finding in that regard was amply 
supported. The jury, however, due to the court's error 
as herein maintained, went further and found plaintiff 
guilty of contributory negligence. The only contention 
ever made by defendant regarding the details of plain-
tiff's alleged contributory negligence was that plaintiff 
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was injured ''as a result of his own failure to exercise 
reasonable care to maintain his footing and balance on 
the car." The only evidence regarding plaintiff's posi-
tion on the car and his activity while on the car was his 
own evidence and defendant and jury alike were there-
fore bound by it. He never breathed one word which 
could have warranted the jury in finding that he was 
negligent nor was there a single scintilla of evidence 
which warranted the submission of this issue to the jury. 
His testimony stands uncontroverted and unquestioned 
to the effect that the sole and only cause of his falling 
was the sudden, unusual and unexpected jerk. We, there-
fore, respectfully submit that the submission of the issue 
of contributory negligence to the jury and the mitiga-
tion of damages in the amount of $20,000.00 for contri-
butory negligence was prejudicial error and therefore 
the verdict should be reinstated in its entirety. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the authorities 
support his contentions made on cross-appeal. 
DeZano v. Roberts, 182 S. W. 771 (Mo. 1916). 
This action was brought under the Federal Employ-
ers' Liability Act. The plaintiff, a fireman on an en-
gine, was injured by being jarred from the tender to the 
floor of the engine while it was being coupled to the 
train. The fireman climbed up on the tender and opened 
the chute, allowing coal to flow down in to fill the tender. 
When it was full, he closed the chute, raked back the 
coal from the front edge to prevent it from falling into 
the cab of the engine and then told the engineer he was 
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ready for the coupling to be made. The fireman then 
started down the gate as one does in descending a ladder : 
that is, he had his back to the engine and engineer and his 
face to the south and to the tender. His feet were on the 
slats of the gate, his shovel was in his right hand and he 
was holding onto the top slat with his left. He had gotten 
his feet about two steps down the ladder and was leaning 
over the top thereof with his stomach and face to the 
coal (in order to get under the projecting roof of the 
cab) when the engine moving south in the direction he 
was facing, reached and made impact with the train. 
Plaintiff's evidence was that the coupling was 
harder than any he had ever seen. The violence of the 
blow broke the hold of his left hand and precipitated him 
to the floor of the cab, causing the injuries complained 
of. It was urged by defendant that plaintiff's contri-
butory negligence caused his fall. The Court rej·ected 
that contention and held as a matter of law that there 
was no contributory negligence involved in the case. The 
Court said, p. 773 : 
"What has been said has some application 
also to the objection made to plaintiff's instruc-
tion on the measure of damages because it fails 
to tell the jury of the effect of contributory negli-
gence in diminishing the damages recoverable un-
der the federal act. In addition to the failure of 
the pleadings to present an issue of contributory 
negligence and the obvious disclaimer of any claim 
of that kind in the case, it may be observed that 
we are unable to see wherein the element of con-
tributory negligence is presented either by plead-
ings or by the evidence. Plaintiff was upon the 
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coal at the top of the tender where he was re-
quired to be, and his affirmative answer to the 
engineer that he was ready was not a consent 
that the engineer should recklessly strike the cars 
in making the coupling. If he had remained upon 
his unsteady footing upon the coal until the en-
gine violently struck the cars, he would have been 
in equal or greater danger of being thrown down 
from that position. His start down the ladder 
was in the direct line of his duties, and was ne-
cessary in order to regain his place in the engine. 
And when he started down he could not foresee 
that the coupling would be a violent one. Even 
if the start was rapid, he had a right to suppose 
that the engineer would observe care before the 
engine reached the coupling point. The evidence 
is that it was the unusual violence of the coupling 
that broke his hold and caused him to fall, and 
there is none whatever that an ordinary coupling 
would have broken his hold, or did cause him to 
fall. Hence we see no necessity for going into the 
question whether a plaintiff is required to in-
struct upon the effect, of contributory negligence 
in a suit under the federal act, even though no 
defense of that kind is pleaded or raised by de-
fendant. It is urged that the federal act changes 
the substantive law in regard to contributory neg-
ligence, and makes it a matter of diminution of 
damages rather than a partial defense, and, since 
matters in diminution of damages need not be 
specially pleaded, the plaintiff should have cov-
ered the effect of contributory negligence in his 
instruction on the measure of damages regardless 
of defendant's failure to plead it. But assuming, 
without deciding, that this is true, nevertheless 
it should have no application where neither the 
pleading nor the evidence discloses contributory 
negligence, and the case is tried on the theory 
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that there is none, and with the express dis-
claiiner by the defendant of any claim that there 
is any such negligence. Thornt~on ,on Federal Em-
ployers' Liahility and Safety Aprplialnce Acts (2d 
Ed.) Sec. 9-!, says: 
'· 'This federal statute has not changed the 
rule with reference to the presentation of con-
tributory negligence as a defense, except it is now 
only a partial defense. In the federal courts the 
burden of presenting contributory negligence of 
the plaintiff as a defense has always been upon 
the defendant, and this burden still continues in 
a suit brought under this statute.' 
''The author then goes on to state that, when 
the plaintiff has shown facts from which the jury 
can estimate his damages, if the defendant de-
sires to reduce them by showing plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence, he has the burden of doing 
so, and that, even if the rule of the state be that 
the plaintiff must show himself free of fault, 
still such rule is changed by the federal act, and 
does not apply in a suit thereunder. In the pres-
ent case the state rule and the federal rule are 
the same. 
"Roberts on Injuries to Intersbate Errtjpiloy-
ees, Sec. 119, says whether contributory negli-
gence must be pleaded, in order to be available to 
the defendant, depends upon the law of the state 
where the action is pending, though he also raises 
the question now urged by defendant herein. But, 
as we have said, owing to the absence of contri-
butory negligence, either as a matter of law or as 
a matter of fact for the jury, in the pleadings, 
evidence, and theory upon which tlw case was 
tried, we see no reason for determining in this 
case the interesting question defendant now raises 
for the first time herein.'' 
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Goodman v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 289 Ill. App. 
320, 7 N. E. (2d) 393. This action was brought under 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act by plaintiff as 
Administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband on 
account of his death. It appeared that decedent was in 
the employment of the defendant as a freight engineer. 
He was killed in a collision of his freight train with a 
coal train which was being moved from a side track onto 
the main line on which the freight train was travelling. 
The negligence alleged on the part of the defendant was 
in operating the freight train from the side track onto 
the main line without ascertaining whether or not the 
main line was clear. 
It appeared from the undisputed evidence in the 
case that orders had been given decedent telling him 
that the track ahead was clear all the way through to a 
designated point and that he had a right of way. De-
fendant contended, however, that decedent was guilty of 
contributory negligence in violating a rule requiring an 
extra train to move within yard limits prepared to stop 
unless the main track was seen or known to be clear. 
The jury assessed damages in the amount of $30,-
000.00 and in response to a special interrogatory de-
cided that decedent's contributory negligence contri-
buted to the accident in the amount of $20,000.00. The 
trial court in effect held that as a matter of law de-
cedent's orders that the track ahead was clear to a desig-
nated point, took precedence over the rule heretofore 
mentioned, and that decedent was not guilty of contri-
butory negligence. The trial court disregarded the an-
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swer to the interrogatory and entered judgment upon the 
verdict against the defendant for $30,000.00 The Su-
preme Court supported the trial court's ruling. 
From the opinion we quote, page 400 : 
"Plaintiff objected to the giving of the above 
interrogatory to the jury on behalf of defendant, 
and we think rightfully so. The purpose of giv-
ing a special interrogatory is to ask the jury to 
decide some controlling question in the case which, 
if returned in the affirmative, would control the 
general verdict. In Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Har-
rington, 192 III. 9, at page 32, 61 N. E. 622, 630, 
the court said: 'This interrogatory was properly 
refused, because an affirmative answer to it could 
not have controlled a general verdict had it been 
in favor of appellee.' 
"In addition to that the interrogatory asked 
the jury to state the amount they 'deduct' by way 
of damages. As the Supreme Court of the United 
States said in the case of Seaboard Air Line Ry. 
v. Tilghman, 237 U. S. 499, at page 501, 35 S. 
Ct. 653, 654, 59 L. Ed. 1069 : ' * * * where the 
causal negligence is attributable partly to the car-
rier and partly to the injured employee, he shall 
not recover full damages, but only a diminished 
sum bearing the same relation to the full dam-
ages that the negligence attributable to the car-
rier bears to the negligence attributable to both; 
the purpose being to exclude from the recover"J a 
proportional part of the damages corresponding 
to the employee's contribution to the total negli-
gence.' 
"When the interrogatory asked the jury 'how 
much they deduct' it was confusing and mislead-
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ing and should not have been given. In addition 
to that, if the jury had intended to find that plain-
tiff's intestate was guilty of contributory negli-
gence to the extent of $20,000, such finding would 
have been against the manifest weight . of the 
evidence. 
''As was said in the case of Norfolk & West-
ern Ry. Co. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, at page 
120, 33 S. Ct. 654, 656, 57 L. Ed. 1096, Ann. Cas. 
1914C, 172: 'If the defendant relies upon the 
defense of contribulory negligence, the bu.rden is 
upon it to establish that defense by a preponder-
ance of the evid.ence.' 
''In this case defendant failed to prove con-
tributory negligence on the part of plaintiff's 
intestate ·and any such finding, if 'it had been made 
by the ju.r'Y, shotuld have been set aside by the 
trial court .as being ag.ainst the Jnanifest: weight 
of the evidence." 
Davis' Adm'r et al v. Cincinrnati, N. 0. & T. P. Ry. 
Co., 188 S. W. 1061. Plaintiff brought action as Admin-
istrator on behalf of the widow and minor child of de-
cedent for his wrongfull death under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act. The petition prayed for judg-
ment of $30,000.00, but 'upon the trial the jury returned 
a verdict against the defendant for $2,000.00. The plain-
tiff appealed, citing as error the submission to the jury 
of the question of decedent's contributory negligence. 
The facts are briefly as follows: Decedent, a young man 
21 years of age, was killed by the wrecking of a pas-
senger train causing the engine to overturn and fall on 
him. It appeared that the engine was being driven at 
an excessive rate of speed around a curve where the 
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ties were old and decayed and the spikes were loose caus-
ing an excessive amount of sway on the part of the en-
gine as it proceeded around the curve. There was no af-
firmative evidence indicating that decedent had any 
duty "i th respect to the speed at which the engine was 
being driven at the time and place of the accident. 
The appellate court reversed and granted plaintiff 
a new trial, among other things, for the reason that the 
trial court had committed prejudicial error in submit-
ting the question of contributory negligence to the jury. 
The court stated, page 1064: 
"There is absolutely no proof of any fact or 
circumstance looking to the establishment of any 
negligence on behalf of the deceased. If the train 
was running at an excessive and reckless rate of 
speed the jury might have erroneously concluded 
that, inasmuch as the deceased was working with 
the engineer, and in a way assisting to propel the 
train, he may have been' somewhat to blame for 
this rate of speed. Such a conclusion would have 
been entirely unjustifiable from any fact proven 
by the testimony; but, having had their atten-
tion called by the court to the contributory negli-
gence of the deceased, the jury may have con-
cluded that the court saw something in the evi-
dence justifying the instruction, and, inasmuch as 
it allowed a diminishing of the dmnages, such ef-
fect may have been given to it. We are the more 
impressed with this possible consequence of the 
error in giving the instruction when we consider 
the size of the verdict returned. But, as. there is 
to be another trial we will not further comment 
upon this point, except to say that, under the cir-
cumstances, we think it was prejudicial error to 
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have given any instruction on the question of 
contributory negligence, or to have allowed the 
jury the right to diminish the damages by reason 
thereof.'' 
In Norton v. Maine Central Ry. Co., 100 Atl. 598 
(Maine, 1917), it appeared that a railroad brakeman 
was knocked from his position on top of the train by 
a bridge girder. The uncontroverted evidence revealed 
that the brakeman had no knowledge of the bridge gir-
der nor had he been warned of its presence by the rail-
road company. Defendant contended on appeal that 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent and the appellate 
court held as a matter of law that it was encumbent 
upon the defendant to prove affirmatively his conten-
tion of contributory negligence and that having failed 
to introduce any affirmative evidence revealing contri-
butory negligence, that that issue was properly resolved 
against the defendant as a matter of law. 
Bruner v. McCarthy et al, 142 P. (2d) 649, 651, 
105 Utah 399, (1943). The plaintiff, who was employed 
as a hostler's helper on the railroad of defendants, was 
injured in the course of his employment. He brought ac-
tion under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Trial 
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff and the defendants 
appealed. One Colosimo, the hostler, and plaintiff as the 
helper, were engaged in loading coal in two engines 
coupled together. While plaintiff was crawling over the 
drawbar between the engines to reach a ladder on the 
tender, the engines were suddenly started without the 
customary signal from the plaintiff, or without any 
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warning, causing the injuries complained of. Error was 
assigned in the refusal of the trial court to submit the 
question of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the 
jury. This court supported the trial court and held that 
there was no contributory negligence on the part of the 
plaintiff as a matter of law. The Court stated: 
'·The defendant's claim that the plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence in that of the 
several ways by which he could have climbed to 
the top of the tender. he chose the only danger-
ous one; that the "\Yay chosen was not customarily 
used and was highly dangerous. Defendants also 
contend that the plaintiff, who was to follow Colo-
simo's directions, had been ordered by Colosimo 
to stay on Engine 1182; that if he had obeyed this 
order he would not have been injured; and that 
Colosimo had a right to assume that the plaintiff 
"~ould obey this order. One difficulty with this 
position is that the record does not support it. 
There is no testimony tending to show that it 
was more dangerous to mount the tender in the 
manner chosen by the plaintiff. Defendants ap-
parently rely on Exhibit 3, which is a picture of 
these two engines coupled together. This picture 
shows the draw bar and other items relating to 
the hand holds, etc., on the route which the plain-
tiff chose. However, we cannot from this picture 
conclude that the manner chosen was highly dan-
gerous and a method not customarily used. The 
evidence merely shows that there were several 
ways by which the plaintiff could have gotten on 
top of the tender. The manner in which he was 
to get there was left to his own judgment. The 
record does not show that the way he chose was 
the more dangerous way. Nor does the evidence 
show that Colosimo ordered the plaintiff to stay 
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on Engine 1182. True, Colosimo did testify that 
'I just told him to stay on 1182. That is what I 
told him, just to stay on 1182, and I would take 
care of the 1149.' But it is clear that what he 
meant by this was merely that plaintiff should 
confine his work to 1182 and Colosimo would 
take care of 1149; for in response to the question: 
'All you meant hy that was that you would take 
care of 1149 and Bruner would take care of 1182~', 
Colosimo answered: 'Yes, Sir.' This interpreta-
tion of this statement is further borne out by the 
remainder of Colosimo's testimony. 
"We have then this situation: These two 
men, working together for the first time, were 
stopping and starting the train according to sig-
nals given by the plaintiff. The engines were stop-
ped; Colosimo was putting coal in Engine 1149. 
It was the plaintiff's duty to get on top of the 
tender on Engine 1182. He chose a manner of 
getting there which is not shown by the evidence 
to be either unusual or dangerous. In fact the 
only evidence is that which he gave that he had 
often used this route and that it was a common 
practice among yardmen to do so. Colosimo, with-
out giving a signal or without knowing where the 
plaintiff was, started the engines and threw the 
plaintiff to the tracks and under the wheels of 
one engine. The plaintiff was doing exactly what 
he was requi.red to do in the performance of his 
duties, towit, getting on top of the tender. While 
it may be, a.s defendants argue in their brief, 
that the manner chosen was highly dall1Jgerous, 
there is no evidence bo show this. We must con-
clude that the record does not show contributory 
negligence. 
''Even if there were several means of reach-
ing a point where plaintiff was required to be 
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and one was more safe than the others but all 
were reasonably safe without movement of the 
engine and the plaintiff had a right to rely on the 
engineer and asstune that he would not start the 
engine until he received a signal, we do not think 
the choice of the less safe .,.,oute oould. be con-
sidered as haring contributed to the accident when 
it zcas apparent that the unexpected jar carused 
by the engine's nwvement dislodged the pZairt.-
tiff. Et:en had the latter chosen the safest route, 
a jar wmich he had a right not to expect, and in 
regard to such noHexpectation it could be pre-
sumed he tcmt-ld have regulated his holds .and care 
of traversal, the dislodgment might have hap-
pened. This is a case where the parties were 
members of a \Yorking crew working on signals 
designed for the very safety of that work. Where 
the accident has been caused by the failure to 
give such signal the party working in a crew 
responsible for such omission will not be heard 
to say that the injury suffered could have been 
avoided had the injured party conducted himself 
on the assumption that the signal would not be 
given; that the consequences of the delict could 
have been avoided had the injured party, as ap-
pears from hindsight, so conducted or positioned 
himself as to make the delict inconsequential. 
There are perhaps few instances of accidents in 
industry where one party injured by the negli-
gence of another might not, had he been warned 
of the negligence, have placed himself in more ad-
vantageous position to avoid its consequences. 
One of the criteria in determining the standard 
of care required in industry to fend off a defense 
of contributory negligence is not one fashioned 
by the imagination of judges sitting in their cham-
bers but one measured by the conduct and prac-
tices of the average experienced workman en-
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gaged in that industry in relation to others work-
ing with him in their immediate joint enterprise 
under the system of signals designed for the 
safety of such parties engaged in the enterprise. 
The care which a prudent person will exercise not 
to injure others and that which he will exercise 
in order to protect himself from the uncon-
templated action of others are not necessarily 
governed by the same circumstances. One for 
whose benefit such signal is to be given may, 
while in the conduct of the enterprise, rely on 
the other to give it; and the latter may not, where 
the other has acted according to the standard set 
by the accustomed behavior under such mutual 
undertakings, urge that greater care would have 
avoided the consequences of his omission to give 
the signal.'' 
In the case at bar plaintiff was doing exactly what 
he was required to do in the performance of his duties, 
to wit: moving along the top of the car preparing to 
dismount. He was in a position where he was required to 
be, to wit: a position where he could maintain visual 
communication with the engineer. It is apparent that 
the unexpected jar caused by the engine's movement 
dislodged the plaintiff. This case is undistinguishable 
on any principle of law from the. decision in the B~er 
case. If defendant contends that plaintiff was guilty of 
contributory negligence it is encumbent upon it to intro-
duce affirmative proof to that effect. No such proof 
exists in the record of this case. 
The only evidence, if it may be so designated, of 
plaintiff's contributory negligence was the fact of his 
injury and we, of course, are well aware that a holding 
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by this Court that the mere fact of injury is itself evi-
dence of neglect would do Yiolence to the contentions of 
law as vigorously made by railroad counsel from time 
immemorial. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has declared against any such proposition in unmistak-
able language in all of its recent decisions. See Wilkerson 
r. JlcCarthy, (Utah), 187 P. 2d 188, 69 S. Ct. 29, recently 
decided in that court. The defendant's conception of 
the law in that regard is shown by its Request No. 5 
(R. 43): 
''You are instructed that negligence in the 
operation of the train on which the plaintiff was 
riding cannot be inferred or presumed from the 
fact that plaintiff fell from the car and was in-
jured. X egligence in the operation of the train as 
claimed by the plaintiff must be proved by him 
by a preponderance of the evidence and if he fails 
to sustain that burden, he cannot recover damages 
for the injuries sustained by him.'' 
The Court in Instruction No. 5 stated this prin-
ciple as follows (R. 57) : 
"Neither negligence nor contributory negli-
gence is to be inferred from the mere fact that 
an injury occurred but must be found if at all 
from a preponderance of the evidence.'' 
Of course, the defendant took no exception to this charge. 
Plaintiff excepted to it on the ground and for the rea-
son that he had pled a cause of action under the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur which appears from his com-
plaint, sub-paragraph (d), paragraph V1II (R. 5). Cer-
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tainly it could not be argued here that the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur applied to the plaintiff. He never at 
any time had any control whatsoever over the instru-
mentality which caused his injuries, that control being 
at all times admittedly in the hands of the defendant. 
The question presented is whether the mere· fact 
of plaintiff's injury is proof sufficient to support the 
submission and finding of contributory negligence. 
In the case of Christensen v. Oregon Short LineR. 
Co., 35 Utah 137, 99 P. 676, this Court declared that the 
happening of an accident causing injury is no proof of 
negligence unless the action is one where the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur controls. 
As pointed out in the opinion 1n that case, it is 
not the mere happening of an accident that is evidence 
of negligence, but it is proof of the circumstances sur-
rounding the happening of the accident which constitutes 
proof or evidence of negligence. In this case the only 
circumstances surrounding the happening of the acci-
dent which constitutes proof or evidence of negligence 
is the proof which convinced the jury that plaintiff was 
injured because of the sudden, unexpected and unwar-
ranted jerk of the train which dislodged him from a 
position of safety and threw him to the roadbed where 
his right arm was mangled and destroyed. There are 
simply no circumstances which indicate or prove that 
plaintiff was himself negligent in any way or manner, 
or at all. 
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'y e respectfully subn1it to this Court that if the only 
proof of negligence on the part of the defendant was 
proof of the mere happening of the accident no verdict 
for plaintiff would be allowed to stand. We likewise sub-
mit that inasmuch as the only proof of plaintiff's negli-
gence was the mere happening of the accident, this cross-
appeal must prevail. 
CONCLUSION 
With reference to defendant's appeal plaintiff res-
pectfully submits that defendant received a fair and im-
partial trial before a regularly impaneled and compe-
tent jury; that the verdict as to both liability and dam-
ages was supported and sustained by adequate evidence ; 
that no prejudicial error resulted from any of the in-
structions or rulings of the trial court, and that the dam-
ages awarded were clearly within the scope of the evi-
dence; that no error was committed in the denial of 
defendant's motion for new trial, and that defendant's 
appeal has failed to disclose any error or defects in the 
pleadings or procedure which adversely affected the 
substantial rights of defendant and that the judgment 
of the trial court should therefore be affirmed, except as 
questioned by plaintiff's cross-appeal. 
As to plaintiff's cross-appeal, plaintiff respectfully 
submits that the court erroneously submitted the issue 
of plaintiff's contributory negligence to the jury; that 
the jury erroneously diminished plaintiff's judgment 
on the ground of contributory negligence, and that as 
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matter of law and fact there was not a single scintilla of 
evidence in the record of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence and that the error so committed adversely affected 
the substantial rights of plaintiff and therefore the error 
should now be corrected and the diminution of damages 
made by the jury disallowed and the judgment for plain-
tiff in the amount of $70,000.00 restored. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE & BLACK 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
WAYNE L. BLACK 
Atto.rneys for Respondent arnd 
Cross-App,ellant. ~ 
I 
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